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DEMOCRACY AND THE 
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT 


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DEMOCRACY AND THE 
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT 

PRESENT DAY POLITICAL 
PROBLEMS IN JAPAN 


By 

HIROSHI SATO, Ph.D. 



COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS BOOKSTORE 
ON THE CAMPUS JOURNALISM BUILDING 
2960 BROADWAY NEW YORK 























Copyright 1920, by Hiroshi Sato 


(Published December 1920) 



©CLA611642 


APR 15 1921 



TO 

COUNT SOYESHIMA 
HON. THOMAS BURKE 


















PREFACE 


Inspired by the noble ideas of the greatest statesman of the 
age, President Wilson of the United States, and hoping that the 
writer may contribute his humble service in making Japan safe 
for democracy, he has chosen Democracy and the Japanese 
Government as the subject for the dissertation for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy. 

It is the purpose of this book to examine and discuss the 
influence of our political system upon the political conditions 
which exist in Japan to-day. This phase of our political prob¬ 
lems has not received adequate treatment at the hands of 
writers on the Japanese government. Very often indeed it has 
been entirely ignored although in recent years it has been 
touched by a few able writers such as Professor Uyehara and 
Professor McLaren. 

In 1889 when the present Japanese Constitution was adopted 
the government was in the hands of a minority, and the major¬ 
ity of the people was outside of the pale of political rights. 
Severe restrictions on suffrage were placed upon both electorate 
and candidate for representative of the people. Even to-day, 
after thirty-one years, a large proportion of the people is still 
excluded from participation in political affairs by property 
qualifications. 

Under such conditions there can be but little of what is called 
democratic responsible government; majority rule can hardly 
be expected. Moreover, the present Constitution of Japan does 
not recognize the time-honored principle of majority rule 
applied even to qualified voters, owing to the constitutional 
checks on the representative of the people. However, the 
extension of suffrage in recent years has brought about one 
important change in the Japanese government. It is gradually 
leading those in power to adopt the national policies along a 
majority rule. 

Throughout this volume the writer frankly discusses the real 
working of the Constitution in the hope of advancing the cause 


VI 


Preface 


of popular government in Japan. The writer’s view is that 
democratic principles are not repugnant to a monarchical form 
of government, and that the growth of democratic and respon¬ 
sible government is not incompatible with the most devoted 
loyalty to the Imperial Throne. The writer believes that the 
establishment of democratic institutions in Japan will bring 
the relation between the sovereign and the people closer than 
ever before and that it is the only solution in making Japan safe 
for democracy. 

The book was prepared in partial fulfillment of the require¬ 
ments for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Columbia 
University in the City of New York. The major work in this 
University was done in Political Science under the direction 
of Professor Howard Lee McBain. The writer was at the same 
time studying under Professors Powell and Beard. 

The writer wishes to express his special indebtedness to 
Professor Thomas R. Powell, who has, in the absence of 
Professor H. L. McBain, read the whole of the manuscript 
and given many valuable criticisms and suggestions. Acknowl¬ 
edgments are likewise due to Professor McBain and Professor 
Munroe Smith, who have also kindly read parts of the manu¬ 
script giving many valuable suggestions. The writer has 
also to acknowledge his particular obligation to Mr. P. T. 
Ward, of Columbia University, for his assistance; to Mr. 
G. M. Fisher, secretary of the Y. M. C. A. in Japan, for his 
kindness in reading the manuscript and giving many sug¬ 
gestions. 

Acknowledgment is also due to Miss Frances L. Lurkins, 
Messrs. S. K. Arima, Jinkitsu Shoji, O. Yamaoka, Y. Fujimaki, 
O. Otake and O. Inouye, for their kindly assistance in many 
ways. Lastly the writer offers his sincere thanks to the Ameri¬ 
can institutions at which he has had the privilege of studying. 

Hiroshi Sato 

New York City 
December /, 1920 


Table of Contents 


DEMOCRACY AND THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT 

Chapter i 

Democracy and The Executive Department 

Chapter 2 

Democracy and the Legislative Department 

Chapter j 

Democracy and The Japanese Election Law before *919 

Chapter 4 

Democratic Movement for the Extension of the Suffrage 

Chapter 5 

Democracy and Local Government 
Chapter 6 

Democracy and Municipal Government 
































Chapter I 


DEMOCRACY AND THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 

To find out the degree of democracy of a nation, one must 
study the system of government through which the affairs 
of the nation are administered. Democracy depends upon a 
system of fundamental law, namely, a constitution. A govern¬ 
ment is democratic just in proportion as it responds to the will 
of the people. If a constitution is erected as a bulwark against 
public opinion, the government created by it is undemocratic 
just in proportion as it is inelastic. This follows from the fact 
that in a society in which the people are really sovereign, a 
constitution is merely the means of securing the supremacy of 
public opinion, and not of thwarting it. Hence it necessarily 
follows that any constitution which is democratic in spirit 
must yield to change in public opinion. 

With this view let us examine the working of the Japanese 
Constitution rather than its theory. However, to understand 
the true nature of the Japanese government, one must take 
into consideration not only the Constitution proper, but its 
supplementary laws as well. 

The government of Japan is in theory an absolute monarchy, 
in form a limited, constitutional monarchy, and in fact a 
thoroughgoing bureaucracy. At its head stands the sovereign, 
who is at the same time the supreme executive, a co-ordinate 
legislative authority (and, in theory, much more than that), 
the fountain of justice and of honor, the commander-in-chief 
of the army and navy, the conservator of peace, and the guard¬ 
ian of the helpless and the needy. In law, all land is held, 
directly or indirectly, of him. Technically, the sovereign 
never dies; there only a demise of the crown, i. e., a transfer 
of regal authority from one person to another, and the state 
is never without a recognized head. Article I of the Constitu- 


2 Democracy and Japanese Government 

tion says: “The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and 
governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.” 
So far as the Constitutional provisions are concerned, there is 
no country where the theory of a divine right to rule is acknowl¬ 
edged to such a degree. No Stuart ever even dreamed of 
such pretensions. 

As to legislative authority, the Emperor exercises his power 
with the consent of the Diet. 1 And as the Emperor, by Article 
VI, “gives sanction to laws and orders them to be promul¬ 
gated and executed,” it naturally and logically follows, accord¬ 
ing to Prince I to that “he also possesses the power to refuse 
his sanction.” 2 In respect to this, Dr. Uyehara says: “The 
sanction of the sovereign to a bill is the final step in Japanese 
legislation. The Emperor is absolutely free either to give 
or to refuse sanction. Therefore, it may be said that the Em¬ 
peror has an absolute veto over all legislation. There is no 
constitutional way for the Diet to override the veto of the 
Emperor.” 3 Therefore it seems that there is no particular 
difference between a constitutional amendment and an ordinary 
law, except that the former must be initiated by the Emperor 
and be approved by a two-thirds majority of both Houses. 4 The 
Emperor is entirely free to block any legislation, whether it 
is a constitutional amendment or an ordinary bill. 

The assertions that have been made represent with sub¬ 
stantial accuracy the ultimate theory of the status of the Em¬ 
peror in the governmental system. In respect to the form and 
practice of that system, however, it would hardly be possible 
to make assertions that would convey a more erroneous 
impression. Therefore, to understand the place of the Em¬ 
peror in the Japanese scheme of government, we must study 

1 Article XXXVII. 

2 1 to, Commentaries, p. n. 

8 Dr. Uyehara, Political Development of Japan, p. 128 . 

4 In regard to amendment, Prince Ito says: “The right of making an amendment 
to the Constitution must belong to the Emperor himself as he is sole author of it.” 
(' Commentaries, p. ; 40 .) This means that all amendments must be set in motion by 
the will of the Emperor. The people must wait until the sovereign recognizes the 
necessity of amending the Constitution. 


3 


The Executive Department 

the real working of the Constitution. The extent of the dis¬ 
crepancy between theory and fact will become apparent 
upon an examination into the operations of the executive and 
the legislative departments of the government. 

It is necessary first of all to examine the function of the 
Cabinet. All administrative functions are carried on by the 
Cabinet Ministers. The Cabinet in a collective sense has no 
formal recognition in the Japanese Constitution. Article 
LV says: “The respective Ministers of State give their advice 
to the Emperor and are responsible for it. All laws, Imperial 
ordinances, and Imperial rescripts of whatever kind that 
relate to the affairs of State, require the countersignature 
of a Minister of State.” In order, therefore, to obtain any 
clear conception of the functions of ministers, it is necessary 
to turn to a group of Imperial ordinances issued in 1885-1889, 
which are still in force by virtue of Article LXXVI of the 
Constitution providing that “existing legal enactments such 
as laws, regulations, ordinances, or by whatever names they 
may be called shall, so far as they do not conflict with the 
present Constitution, continue in force.” According to these 
Imperial decrees, ministers are responsible for all matters 
falling within their sphere, and are empowered to issue de¬ 
partmental ordinances, to present for the Cabinet’s considera¬ 
tion drafts of laws relating to their departments and projects 
for amendment or abrogation of existing laws, to organize 
their respective departments, and to delegate to their sub¬ 
ordinates any of their numerous functions except the counter¬ 
signing of laws or ordinances, personal reports to the Emperor, 
voting in the cabinet meetings, and the issue of departmental 
ordinances. 

This raises two questions: first, to whom are the ministers 
responsible? second, are they responsible individually or 
collectively? As to these questions, Marquis Ito has explained 
the text, making a positive statement that the members of 
the Cabinet are charged with responsibility to the Emperor, 

each within the limits of his jurisdiction for every public 

« 


4 


Democracy and Japanese Government 

act of the sovereign. The evil of a system of joint responsi¬ 
bility would be, Marquis Ito holds, that the power of party 
combination would ultimately overrule the supreme power 
of the Emperor. 5 

The objection of the framers of our Constitution to joint 
responsibility of the Ministers is said to be their fear that this 
would result in encroachment upon the power of the Emperor. 
Marquis Ito observes: 

In some countries the cabinet is regarded as constituting a 
co-operative body; the Ministers are not held to take part in the 
conduct of the government each one in an individual capacity, 
but joint responsibility is the rule. The evil of such a system is 
that the power of party combination will ultimately overrule the 
supreme power of the Emperor. Such a state of things can never 
be approved of according to our Constitution. But with regard to 
important internal and external matters of State, the whole govern¬ 
ment is concerned, and no single department can therefore be 
exclusively charged with the conduct of them. As to the expediency 
of such matters and as to the mode of carrying them out, all the 
Ministers of State shall take united counsel, and none of them is 
allowed to leave his share of the business to be a burden upon his 
colleagues. In such matters, it would, of course, be proper for 
the Cabinet to assume joint responsibility . 6 

The Imperial Decree of the year 1889 provides that all laws 
and Imperial ordinances, affecting the administration as a 
whole, shall bear the counter-signature of the Minister Presi¬ 
dent as well as that of the Minister from whose Department 
they directly emanate. It is by this provision and also by the 
constitutional provision of Article LV, that the Imperial 
Ordinance dissolving the Diet requires the counter-signature 
of each of the Cabinet Ministers in order to establish a joint 
responsibility. When any member of the Cabinet refuses 
to countersign, the Cabinet cannot dissolve the Diet. 7 Such, 
at least, is the theory of the law. 

6 Commentaries, pp. 94-95. 

6 1 bid, 94-95. 

declaration of war and peace also requires counter-signature of each of the Cabinet 
Ministers. 


5 


The Executive Department 

It is said that the object of instituting the cabinet system 
in 1885 was to concentrate the administrative power in the 
hands of the Minister President, to make him responsible 
for the general policy of the government by subordinating 
all departmental Ministers to him and by holding them respon¬ 
sible only for their respective departments. At the same time, 
there appeared the additional purpose of making the admin¬ 
istrative machinery adaptable to the Constitution under 
contemplation. 8 If these were the motives for adopting the 
cabinet system, why is it that the power of the Minister 
President, head of the Cabinet, is so much curtained? If he 
is responsible, and it is his official duty to see that laws are 
faithfully executed, should he not have more power—especially 
the power of appointment and dismissal of his subordinates? 
As to the appointive power of the Minister President, it has 
been the custom ever since the creation of the cabinet system 
for the Minister President to advise the Emperor in the matter 
of nomination of ministers. So far this practice has never 
been violated. 9 The Emperor has always accepted the advice 
of the in-coming Minister President in the matter of appoint¬ 
ments. 

However, we must remember in this connection that his 
power of selection of Ministers for the Army and the Navy 
is restricted to a small group of men who are generals and 
lieutenant-generals in the Army and admirals and vice- 
admirals in the Navy. The Imperial Ordinance of 1894, 
promulgated while the Yamagata Cabinet was in power, 
makes it impossible for any civilian to take the army or the 
navy portfolio in the Cabinet. 10 Under this system, it has 

8 Japan Weekly Mail, April 3, 1896; Prince Sanjo’s Memorial to the Emperor, 
December, 1885, on organization of the Respective Departments. 

•Ex-Minister Ozaki, in conversation with the writer, April 17, 1919. New York, 
N. Y. 

10 Professor Uyehara— Nippon Minken Hattatsu Shi (Development of Political 
Right of the People), p. 408. It is said that the indifferent attitude by the House toward 
the Bill when presented before the House was due to the fact that hitherto the posts 
of Ministers of Army and Navy were always filled by military officers. The House 
did not at that time think its apathy would bring about such an important result. 



6 Democracy and Japanese Government 

been possible, to a large extent, for the Supreme Military 
Council to control the policy of the Cabinet. An example may 
serve to make this matter clear. In December, 1912, when 
the second Saionji Cabinet was in power, the Premier and his 
associates were forced to resign in spite of the fact that they 
enjoyed the support of the majority of the members of the 
Lower House of the Diet. The cause of the downfall of the 
ministry was the defection from its ranks of the Minister of 
the Army, General Uyehara, whose resignation came about 
in consequence of the refusal of the Cabinet to adopt as part 
of its legislative program for the year an army measure pro¬ 
viding for the creation of two new divisions. Uyehara exer¬ 
cised his constitutional right to resign, but the Supreme 
Military Council made the ministry pay the penalty by re¬ 
fusing to detail a qualified officer to take his place, which 
made it impossible to fill the vacancy in the Cabinet and thus 
forced the Minister President and his colleagues to resign. 

Another example may serve to show how impossible it 
is for the Minister President to resist the military branch of 
government. When the great naval and military expansion 
was decided upon after the Russo-Japanese war, the plan 
had been drafted and the approval of the Emperor had been 
obtained before the Prime Mininster was informed. “Thus,” 
says Mr. Ozaki, “Minister President as he was in name, he 
had no part whatever in the decision on schemes of national 
defence which are intimately related to the most important 
affairs of State, diplomacy and finance; but had the honor of 
being notified of the result only after the question had been 
finally disposed of by the Emperor.” 11 Thus, although he 
is legally the head of the ministers and has general control 
over the various branches of the administration, 12 he is entirely 
helpless in such a situation; to reject any plan means that he 
is acting against the will of the Emperor, which has already 
been expressed. 

11 Constitutional Loyalty, Ozaki, pp. 76-77. 

12 See Imperial Notification No. 135 issued in 1889 on function of the Cabinet, 
Article II. 


7 


The Executive Department 

The significance of this practice will be appreciated when 
it is recalled that the essence of cabinet government is unan¬ 
imity of its members. If the Cabinet embraces any malcon¬ 
tent, it is impossible to conduct an efficient administration. 
An English writer says of this: 

It is absolutely necessary that there should be in the conduct 
of affairs in this country, an avowed and real minister, possessing 
the chief weight, in the Council and the principal place in the 
confidence of the King. There can be no rivalry or division of 
power. That power must rest in the person generally called the 
First Minister, . . . If it should unfortunately come to such 

a radical difference of opinion that no spirit of conciliation or con¬ 
cession can reconcile, the sentiment of the minister must be allowed 
and understood to prevail, leaving the other members of the admin¬ 
istration to act as they may conceive themselves consciously called 
upon to act under such circumstances . 13 

In Japan, as long as the present system prevails, it is im¬ 
possible even for the recognized leader of a party to construct 
an efficient cabinet for prosecuting a uniform course of action. 
The popular elements in Japan welcomed the Cabinet of Hara 
in 1918, because Hara was the first commoner who ever formed 
a cabinet. His success was considered a sure victory for parlia¬ 
mentary government. It was hailed as government by party, 
but how can it be called a government by party in a true sense, 
when it contains two hostile members who served under the 
former Cabinet? 

This inquiry into the place of the Army and Navy Minis¬ 
ters in the Japanese system will lead the reader to ask: “If 
the Cabinet is not the real working executive organ in Japan, 
where is the real seat of executive power?” To answer this 
question, the nature of the Genro, or “invisible government” 
of Elder Statesmen in Japan, must be taken into account. 

The institution which retards the democratic development 
of constitutional government in Japan more than anything 
else is the Genro . At present it is more powerful than any other 
institution, except, of course, the Emperor. It is an entirely 

13 Stanhope, Life of Pitt, Vol. IV, p. 24. 


8 Democracy and Japanese Government 

extra-constitutional body, d he Elder Statesmen have no 
official standing in the Japanese Constitution. Therefore, 
if they participate in the determination of national policies, 
it is not only a violation of the spirit of the Constitution, but 
also an encroachment upon the rights of the Privy Council, 
which has a constitutional standing as the highest deliberative 
body of the Emperor’s official family. Nevertheless, the Elder 
Statesmen have, by custom, acquired an enormous power— 
power to advise and even power to form and overthrow cab¬ 
inets. It has been the custom to call them into deliberation at 
every meeting of importance. They have been by custom in 
a position to nominate the organizer of the Cabinet, namely, 
the Minister President. Generally speaking, no change of 
Cabinet is effected nor any treaty concluded without their 
advice. 

In nominating the Prime Minister, the Elder Statesmen are 
guided by the principle of clan government (Hambatsu Seifu ), 
that is, they usually recommend to the Emperor as an organizer 
of the Cabinet a man who is affiliated with one of the two great 
western clans, namely, Satsuma and Choshu. They recom¬ 
mend outsiders—party politicians—to organize the Cabinet 
whenever they think it necessary as, for instance, the recom¬ 
mendation of Okuma in 1914 and of Hara in 1918. 

The abolition of the rule of the Genro presents one of the 
most vital problems in the development of constitutional 
government. Such a task is not easy. The frequent impeach¬ 
ment (Dangai) 14 of super-party cabinets, an increase in the 
party strength, and political education of the people may 
decrease the power of the Genro , but these are not enough to 
destroy the foundations of their strength. At present the most 

14 The word “Dangai” does not mean impeachment as it is used in America. How¬ 
ever the word is often translated “impeachment,” because its use is regarded in Japan 
as deadly as impeachment. The word really means “right of address* (Dangai Josoan— 
a proposed impeachment to the throne) by the Lower House to the Emperor censuring 
specific acts of the government. Dangai must be supported by absolute majority of 
the members in the Lower House. “Dangai” or impeachment is also used for the 
resolution of the Lower House censuring some specific acts of the government. But 
it is the Dangai Josoan that is the most effective. 



9 


The Executive Department 

influential power they exercise is the right of recommending 
the Prime Minister. If they lose this right, their power will 
naturally disappear. To eliminate the Genro, therefore, it 
is necessary to destroy the source of their power. This source 
is an Imperial Ordinance of 1894 m reference to the appoint¬ 
ment of army and navy officers to portfolios in the Cabinet. 15 
And at present, from the affiliation of the clans with the mili¬ 
tary and bureaucratic circles, the real power derived from 
this Ordinance is in the hands of the Elder Statesmen. It is 
by controlling these army and navy officers that they have 
the power to set up or overthrow cabinets. Therefore it is 
impossible to deprive the Elder Statesmen of the right, ac¬ 
quired by custom, of recommending an organizer of the Cabinet 
unless the Imperial Ordinance in question is repealed. 

Such being the true state of affairs, the actual depository 
of the real executive power, of which the sovereign is the sym¬ 
bol, is an extra-constitutional council, the Genro. The mem¬ 
bers of this organization, by their immense prestige as the 
founders of modern Japan, virtually exercise sovereign powers 
in all emergencies of domestic and foreign policies. The 
Cabinet Ministers are nothing but their secretaries charged 
with performing the routine of administration under their 
guidance and supervision. 

Besides the Genro there is another political institution which 
overshadows the power of the Cabinet—the Privy Council. 
The Privy Council is a deliberative body only so far as the 
letter of the Constitution is concerned. It is neither a legis¬ 
lative nor an executive body at all. Article VIII of the Im¬ 
perial Ordinance of April, 1888, says: “Though the Privy 
Council is the Emperor’s highest resort of council, it shall not 
interfere with the Executive.” Therefore, anything that the 
Council does in the nature of executive, legislative, and ad¬ 
ministrative work is unconstitutional. 

According to the Imperial Ordinance of 1890, which minutely 
describes its functions, the Council has power to hold its meet- 

15 See page 5 and 6 in reference to the power of Prime Minister. 


io Democracy and Japanese Government 

ings to deliberate and to express its opinion in reference to 
any important matters, such as treaty making and the proc¬ 
lamation of the law of siege and all laws supplementary to 
the Constitution and Ordinances. It is largely due to this 
provision that the Privy Council can exercise a dominant 
power over the Cabinet. Although the function of the Council 
is merely deliberative, so far as the letter of the Constitution 
is concerned, the Council can practically reject any measure 
of the Cabinet, since it is the highest advisory council of the 
Emperor. In fact, therefore, the deliberation of the Council 
has more weight with the Emperor than that of the Cabinet. 
In fact, no important legislative measure can be promulgated 
without the consent of the Privy Council. 16 When the Cabinet 
wishes to introduce any important measure in the Diet, it is 
customary for it first to send the bill to the Council which 

i 

will presumably sanction its introduction. Without securing 
the approval of the Council in advance, it is useless for the 
Cabinet to introduce a bill, for if a bill approved by the Diet 
is later rejected by the Council, the Cabinet will be humiliated, 
and its efforts, as well as those of the Diet, will become naught. 
The Cabinet Ministers well understand that the actual opera¬ 
tion of the government can not be carried on smoothly without 
the co-operation as well as the sanction of the Council. 

The Privy Council in Japan is the equivalent of the Supreme 
Court of the United States so far as the sole power of inter¬ 
pretation of the constitution is concerned. All questions of 
Constitutional interpretation are presented by the government 
to the Council, since there is no other body which has any 
legal power in the matter. The Cabinet is the only official 
channel of communication with the Council. The proceedings 
and deliberations of the Council are secret, and no outside 
body is permitted to participate in them. Of course, its 
decision is subject to the will of the Emperor. 

The significance of this power of constitutional interpreta¬ 
tion in the hands of the Council for the future of democracy 

16 There are at present thirty-nine members, of whom ten are Cabinet Ministers. 


The Executive Department 


ii 


of Japan can be easily seen, especially if the Diet becomes more 
and more dominant. The popular representatives have no 
power to participate in the decision of constitutional questions. 
These are handled by an irresponsible body, which is placed 
far beyond the reach of the electorate. So far there has been 
no difficulty in the matter, 17 but with the advance of democracy 
the Constitution must be interpretated to suit the progress 
of the day. Especially is this true of the Japanese Constitu¬ 
tion, in which only fundamental rules of the State are embodied 
in broad and general language. 

The Council also has the power to make and to revoke 
treaties in conjunction with the Cabinet. In this important 
function, too, the popularly elected chamber 18 has no power 
to participate. The Law (. Koshikirei ) provides: “All laws and 
ordinances which have been approved by the Privy Council 
must have its signature,” 19 in order that its judgment may 
have more weight in the decisions of the Cabinet. In like 
manner, laws and ordinances which have been approved by 
the Privy Council cannot be amended or changed without its 
consent. 20 This is an enormous power of the Privy Council, 
since the Cabinet must get the approval of that body for any 
important bill or law before presenting the same to the Diet. 

Why is such enormous power given to the Privy Council, 
the members of which are not responsible? They (excepting 
Cabinet Ministers who are members of the Council) are in 
no fear of impeachment by the House, since they have no 
official relation with the House, but only with the Cabinet. 21 
Members of the Council are not subject to the interpellation 

17 In 1892 in a hard-fought contest with the House of Representatives, the Upper 
House won for itself an imperial interpretation (in fact a Privy Council decision) to 
the effect that it had the right to reinsert in the Budget items expunged by the House 
of Representatives, i. e., that it had equal rights of amendment with the latter. Cle¬ 
ment Constitution Imperialism in Japan , p. 21. 

18 See Imperial Ordinance No. 22, 1888. 

19 G. Soyeshima, Present and Future of Constitutional Government, Nippon Oyobi 
Nippon , January issue, p. 31. 

20 Ibid. 

21 Regulations of the Business of the Privy Council (Imperial Ordinance, Nov. 
•22, 1888), Article III. 


12 Democracy and Japanese Government 

of the Diet as are the Cabinet Ministers. It would seem that 
the framers of the Constitution thought that dangerous demo¬ 
cratic movements could be checked only by creating a Privy 
Council far beyond the reach of the electorate. They thought 
that the Cabinet Ministers might sometimes represent a 
popular will contrary to their interests, and that they might 
influence even the Upper House by patronage and by some other 
means. Therefore, the framers may have felt the necessity 
of finding some institution which would be far beyond the 
reach of the Cabinet, the Houses and the electorate. 

We have seen that the Privy Council is higher than the 
Cabinet in its relation to the Emperor. Then what will be 
the attitude of the Cabinet in case of conflict with the Council? 
In case of a conflict with the Lower House, the Cabinet can 
dissolve the House; in case of a conflict with the Upper House, 
the Cabinet can advise the Emperor to swamp the House 
with the appointment of new members if necessary; but in a 
conflict with the Privy Council, the Cabinet can neither dis¬ 
solve nor swamp that body. 

Up to this day there has been no serious conflict between 
the Cabinet and the Privy Council, as both have been and still 
are occupied by men of the same mode of thinking. For 
many years past, the Cabinet, with the approval of the Council 
issued many Imperial Ordinances which have the same effect 
as law. 22 This power of the Cabinet to issue an Imperial Or¬ 
dinance in conjunction with the Privy Council is one of the 
most powerful weapons of the bureaucrats against democracy. 
Thus, when the Cabinet is on friendly terms with the Privy 
Council, the Cabinet can easily make laws independently of 
the Diet by means of Imperial Ordinances. 

However, with the development of the parliamentary 
system, the friendly relation between the Cabinet and the 
Council will not long continue. There is every indication that 
the Privy Council will not harmonize with the policy of the 

22 For instance, Imperial Ordinance of 1894 and Imperial Ordinance No. 205 in 
references to civil liberties. 


13 


The Executive Department 

Cabinet, especially when the Cabinet is formed by the support 
of a party. "If the Privy Council is,” as Ito hopes, “competent 
to lend assistance to the wisdom of the Emperor, to be impar¬ 
tial, with no leaning to this or that body, and to solve all 
difficult problems, it will certainly prove an important piece 
of constitutional mechanism.” 23 But, if not, it will be the worst 
constitutional barrier against the development of democracy. 

The recent attitude of the Council toward the liberal ministry 
has aroused apprehension among our liberal statesmen. It 
has greatly usurped its constitutional power by interfering 
with the legislative and administrative functions of the Cabinet. 
For example, during the Okuma administration, the Privy 
Council presented to the Cabinet various objections to the 
enforcement of a factory law passed in 1911. As a result 
this factory law was not promulgated until 1916—five years 
after it was passed by the Diet. 

No doubt with the progress of democracy it must become 
more and more evident that a system which places this far- 
reaching power in the hands of a body not amenable to proper 
control, is a constant menace to liberty. It not only may be 
made to serve the purpose of defeating reform but may even 
accomplish the overthrow of popular rights. Unless the Privy 
Council entertains a more liberal view, no cabinet, even with 
the support of both Houses, will be able to pass any liberal 
legislation. 


23 Commentaries , p. 98. 



Chapter II 


DEMOCRACY AND THE LEGISLATIVE 

DEPARTMENT 

Coupled with the executive department in Japan, there is 
* the Diet, the legislative organ, a bicameral legislature consist¬ 
ing of a House of Peers and a House of Representatives. The 
organization and legal powers of the Diet are provided for 
by the Constitution, the law of the Houses, the law of election 
and various other Imperial ordinances issued in 1889 and 
1890. 

The law concerning the House of Peers was promulgated 
not as ordinary law, but as an Imperial Ordinance to be 
amended upon the initiation of the Emperor with the consent 
of the House of Peers alone. While the rules of organization 
for the Lower House are determined by both Houses, the 
Lower House cannot participate in the determination of sim¬ 
ilar rules for the Peers. 1 

In 1918, the House of Peers was composed of 374 members, 
of whom 210 were peers, 119 Imperial nominees, and 45 repre¬ 
sentatives of the highest tax-payers. 2 Among the peers the 
hereditary members are the Imperial princes and the princes 
and marquises. The rest of the members of the peers are 
elected by and from the Counts, Viscounts, and Barons. 

Next in number to these nobles come the Imperial nominees. 
They are mostly government officials or former government 
officials. They are nominated by the Emperor on account 
of erudition or meritorious services to the State on the advice 
of the Ministers of State, who are not responsible to the 


1 Law of the Houses, Article CXI. 

2 Japan Year Book, 1918, p. 637. 


15 


The Legislative Department 

people. These Imperial nominees hold office for life 3 and, 
being generally the ablest men in the House, exercise a dom¬ 
inating influence. Next in number to these nobles and Imperial 
nominees come the representatives of the highest tax-payers. 
They are elected, one member for each Fu (Municipal Prefec¬ 
ture) and Ken (Prefecture), by and from the tax-payers of the 
highest amount of direct national tax on land, industry, or 
trade therein, and are afterwards appointed (commissioned) 
by the Emperor. This group, comprising about one-eighth 
of the total number of the Peers and consisting, as it does, of 
men of wealth, is said to be the most incompetent and least 
important of the three groups. An ordinance also provides 
that the peers, hereditary or representative, shall not be out¬ 
numbered by Imperial nominees and the representatives of 
the highest tax-payers. Articles IV and VI of ordinance further 
provide that the term of all elective members shall be seven 
years. 

An analysis of the composition of the House of Peers clearly 
indicates the general tendency of its political force. The 
control of the Upper House by the aristocracy exercising 
co-ordinate powers with the Lower House explains the weakness 
of the representative body. The Upper House on account of 
the aristocratic traditions of the majority of its members has 
little sympathy with any democratic movement. Its members 
invariably support the government no matter who form it so 
long as the government adheres to its traditional principles 
of bureaucracy. The members of the Peers, unlike the repre¬ 
sentatives of the Lower House, are exempt entirely from elec¬ 
tion by the people either directly or indirectly. This means 
that they do not feel any responsibility to the people at all. 
In conflict with the Lower House, the Peers can stop all legisla¬ 
tion, however important and necessary it may be, without 
any consequent fear of dissolution. They can block every 

3 The House of Peers was composed as follows on December 25, 1917. on the 
occasion of the fortieth session: Princes of the Blood, 13; Princes, 13; Marquises, 
36; Counts, 17; Viscounts, 69; Barons, 62; Imperial nominees, 119; Highest tax¬ 
payers, 45. 


16 Democracy and Japanese Government 

governmental bill if such is against their interests. It is true 
that, in case of extreme necessity the Ministry can advise 
the Emperor to create a great many Imperial nominees and 
peers above the ranks of Count and thus swamp the Upper 
House. For there is no limitation to the number of Princes 
and Marquises who ex officio occupy seats in the House of 
Peers, although the Imperial Ordinance limits the total number 
of members of elective peers, namely, Count and Viscount 
and Baron, and although in the matter of the Imperial nom¬ 
inees, the Emperor is limited to 125. As a matter of fact this 
method is not so simple as a dissolution and has never been 
practiced, because the Upper House has almost invariably 
supported the Ministry in the past. 

Perhaps, aside from the undemocratic extra-legal institution 
of the Genro and the bureaucratic deliberative organ of the 
Privy Council, the chief obstacle in the way of development 
of true democratic government is the existence of the House 
of Peers. Even today, the majority of this legislative organ 
distrust the organ of popular representation. They regard 
political parties as bodies inconsistent with the established 
order and the Constitution. This inherent distrust of parties 
by the majority of Peers accounts for the small success of 
the so-called party cabinets, even when they are supported 
by a majority of the Representatives of the people. 

We have the authority of Marquis I to for the fact that the 
framers of the Constitution did not like to see the organized 
activities of political parties in the House of Representatives. 
They wished the government not to be subject to “the influence 
of one-sided movements” and “the despotisms of the major¬ 
ity” of the House of Representatives. 4 They felt that the 
Upper House, which is composed of “the higher grade of so¬ 
ciety,” would check this much-dreaded political tide in the 
House of Representatives and protect the government from 
its encroachment. 5 “If the House of Peers fulfils its functions,” 

* I to, Commentaries, p. 64. 

6 Ibid, 65. 


17 


The Legislative Department 

says I to, “it will serve in a remarkable degree to preserve 
an equilibrium between political parties, to check the evil 
tendencies of irresponsible discussions in the House of Repre¬ 
sentatives, and to be an instrument for maintaining harmony 
between the government and the governed.” 6 

If the Upper House had served the country as a stabilizer, 
as I to hoped, then it would have won the respect and esteem 
of the people. But the parliamentary history of the last thirty 
years does not indicate the development of the Upper House 
along the line that Ito desired. Indeed Ito himself suffered 
at the hands of the Upper House. 

In 1900, Ito, renouncing his traditional view of government, 
took the role of leader of the newly reorganized Liberal Party 
under the name of Seiyukai, and formed a Ministry on some¬ 
thing resembling party lines under his premiership. No 
sooner had this happened than factions in the Peers united 
against the government, because they believed that the very 
existence of party government was a menace to the established 
order and the Constitution. They believed that their former 
friend, Ito, had abandoned his old conservative idea. They 
strongly opposed the passage of the Budget for 1901. So per¬ 
sistent was the determination of the Peers that Ito, after 
exhausting every means of persuading them to pass the Budget, 
was finally compelled to resort to an Imperial Rescript. 

It may be interesting to note here an incident which took 
place in connection with this Imperial Rescript. Ito, after 
trying every ordinary device for inducing the Peers to pass 
the bill, had asked for an Imperial Rescript which was granted. 
After perceiving his difficulty in the Upper House, he wished 
to resign his premiership. The Emperor, hearing this, said: 
“You say that you wish to resign. You are fortunate indeed 
to be in a position to resign. But how about me? I can not 
resign like you. You must try to the best of your ability.” 7 

6 Ibid, pp. 65, 66. 

7 Representative Motsuzuki, Speech on the Japanese Position on the Treaty, May, 
1919, before the Columbia Japanese students. 


18 Democracy and Japanese Government 

It was said that I to was deeply struck with admiration for 
the Emperor and abandoned his purpose. 

I to was not the only one who suffered at the hands of the 
Upper House. During the Yamamoto Cabinet, the govern¬ 
ment suffered from an amendment to its budget by the Peers. 
In spite of the fact that the bill was regarded as one of the most 
important measures, the Peers cut down the original naval 
appropriation of 130,000,000 yen a year by 70,000,000 yen 
a year. 8 Usually, unlike the House of Representatives, the 
Peers, when opposed to the governmental policy, amend its 
bill in such a way that it is impossible for the government 
to carry out a desired program because of lack of funds. This 
is the strongest weapon of the Peers, and they often use it 
against the government instead of the right of address in the 
form of impeachment (. Dangai ) as is the case in the House 
of Representatives. 

The House of Representatives is composed of members 
elected by the people in accordance with the provisions of 
the law of election. Under the new revised election laws 
there are 464 members. The actual powers of the Lower 
House are of necessity limited by reason of the fact that it 
can not hold the cabinet responsible for its public policy. 

Formal communication between the Diet and the Executive 
is regulated by the Constitution and the Law of the House. 
The only method of communication between the legislature 
and the Crown is an address, which, like any other resolution 
of either House, must have the support of the majority of 
the members present at the sitting. The Crown may com¬ 
municate with the legislature at will by means of an imperial 
rescript addressed to either of the Houses through the medium 
of its President. 

Communication between the Diet and the Cabinet is carried 
on by divers means. Either House may make representations 
to the Ministry concerning laws or upon any other subject. 
These representations, like other resolutions of the House, 


8 Uyehara, Nippon Minken Hattatsu Shi, p. 584. 


19 


The Legislative Department 

must, to be in due form, be supported by a majority of the 
members. Further, members of either House may inter¬ 
pellate the Ministers, and if the questions are presented in 
due form and are not objectionable in content, the Ministers 
must reply or state in writing their reasons for not doing so. 
On the other hand, members of the Cabinet, though they 
may not be members of either House, have free access to the 
Diet. Ministers of State or their delegates may attend the 
sitting of either House and all committee meetings and may 
speak at any time, provided the floor is not already occupied. 
The Cabinet may introduce projects of laws, and such bills 
have the right of way on “the order of the day,” unless the 
government consents to a postponement of the debate. 9 The 
Cabinet may withdraw any of its bills at any stage of their 
progress through either House. 10 

Relative to the Emperor’s co-ordinate power in the matter 
of legislation, the Constitution says: “The Emperor exercises 
the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet.” 11 
So far as this article is concerned, it may be interpreted to 
mean that the Emperor is co-ordinate with the legislature in 
the matter of legislation. However, the framers of the Con¬ 
stitution unquestionably meant by this that the legislative 
power is ultimately under the control of the Emperor, and 
that the duty of the Diet is to give advice and consent. Accord¬ 
ing to this theory (as well as to the present practice) the 
Japanese Diet is not an assembly of representatives of the 
people to control and supervise the government but a mere 
deliberative body. 

This political relation in which the Emperor (in practice, 
his advisers) stands to his popularly elected chamber sheds 
light on many features of Japanese public life which seem 
strange to English and American observers. It explains in 
the first place the fact that it is considered a moral and wholly 

9 Law of Houses, Article XXVI. 

10 Ibid, Article XXX. Article V. 

11 Article V. 


20 Democracy and Japanese Government 

justifiable practice for the monarch—in reality his advisers— 
“the government,” not only to control so far as they are able, 
the election of the members to the representative body, but 
also by rewards and other forms of political pressure to in¬ 
fluence the votes of representatives after election. These 
practices were actually carried on as early as the third election. 
In that year it was said that the government spent more than 
three million 12 yen to buy votes. This caused a conflict be¬ 
tween the government officers and the people resulting in 
388 persons being hurt and 25 killed. 13 In 1914, during the 
Okuma administration, Minister of Interior Oura was com¬ 
pelled to resign as a result of the discovery of his connection 
with bribery. 14 This political relation also explains the policy 
of the “government” in playing off one party or faction against 
another, and thus, through the block system, 15 obtaining a 
majority of votes in favor of action which the government 
desires. It explains still further the right which is freely 
exercised by the “government” of dissolving the elected cham¬ 
ber whenever other methods of obtaining its support for a 
government measure have failed; and, it may be said, so 
powerful is the official influence that may be exerted in the 
ensuing election, that in all cases the result has been that 
the newly chosen chamber was of the desired political com¬ 
plexion. 16 As a matter of fact, the government never failed 
to obtain a favorable result whenever it dissolved the House 
of Representatives during the last twenty years of constitu¬ 
tional government in Japan. It is customary for the Ministers, 
whenever they dissolve the chamber and order a new election, 

12 Shin Nippon, February issue, 1915, p. 4. An appeal to the people before the 
dissolution. 

13 Uyehara, Nippon Minken Shi, p. 254. During the seventeenth session the 
government also (Katsura Ministry) bribed a number of Representatives to pass 
through both the taxation bill and the naval bill.—Uyehara, Mingei Haltatsu, Shi, 
p. 447. 

14 1914—In spite of his clear violation of the election law, he was not arrested. 

15 Perhaps the most outstanding example of this occurred during Premier Katsura’s 
administration. 

16 The elections of 1914. 1917 and 1920 were landslide victories for government or 
pro-government parties. 


21 


The Legislative Department 

to influence the voters by means of a hint of a dissolution of 
the chamber as often as it is necessary unless the election turns 
out as they desire. 

Observing this situation, Mr. Hayashi says: 

It is a general opinion among our people that whenever the 
government dissolves the Diet and a new election is held, it always 
results in the victory for the government. This was shown during 
the administration of Okuma and again this time [Terauchi admin¬ 
istration]. After all, it is not too much to conclude that victory of 
the government in the general election after dissolution is one of 
the peculiar phenomena of governmental supremacy . 17 

Another prominent Japanese, Professor Uyehara, comment¬ 
ing on the supremacy of the government, remarks: 

No doubt the dissolution of the House in the seventeenth session 
was the direct result of the uncompromising attitude of the majority 
party then led by Prince Ito toward the government. In the 
eighteenth session the government and the Seiyukai compromised. 
However, the dark political struggle between them never ceased. 
Seeing this situation, the Emperor, by the advice of the Elder 
Statesman who were influenced by Premier Katsura, appointed Ito 
to the presidency of the Privy Council. This caused Ito to abandon 
the party in order to accept reluctantly the position, because the 
refusal would mean disobedience of an Imperial command. This 
fact is a most noteworthy incident in our constitutional history. 
It signifies that no person—even such a powerful statesman as 
Prince Ito (who had a large influence among the people as well as 
the great confidence of the Emperor, not to mention the fact that 
he was a leader of a majority party)—can successfully oppose the 
government. He was squarely defeated even with a large majority 
party behind him. Under the existing political system, no matter 
who opposes the government, no matter what principles and politi¬ 
cal views he may have, no matter who may control the House as a 
leader of the majority party, as long as the Cabinet stands inde- 

17 Hayashi Election, The Taiyo, Volume 23 (June, 1917). A dissolution enables 
the government to continue the administration for at least five months from the time 
of dissolution without the interference of the House, and to prepare during this interval 
to meet the possible opposition of the new House. But after the dissolution, if the 
Ministers see that public sentiment is very strong against the government, they 
usually resign. In this case pressure is usually brought to bear upon the Cabinet by 
the Privy Council or Elder Statesmen. 



22 Democracy and Japanese Government 

pendent of the majority party and does not take responsibility, 
that is, as long as the Cabinet adheres to a policy repugnant to the 
will of the popular representatives, it is impossible to win ultimate 
success against the Cabinet. Alas! Mighty Ito had succumbed to 
the government led by Katsura . 18 

Thus we see how helpless the popularly elected chamber 
is against the government. The only weapon the chamber 
has is the right of address to the Emperor which might be 
called a sort of impeachment. Under the constitutional pro¬ 
vision either House of the Imperial Diet can present an address 
directly to the Emperor, 19 thus cutting off the monopoly of 
communication of the Cabinet Ministers to the Emperor. 
Owing partly to the peculiar political psychology of the 
people, partly to the fact that the government not only is 
not responsible but also always screens itself behind the 
crown whenever popular attack is acute, the right of address 
by the Diet, especially by the popularly elected chamber, 
has become very important in the history of Japan’s political 
development. 

The right of address to the Emperor is largely traditional. 
In the minds of the people the chief duty of the advisers of 
the Emperor, namely, the “government/’ is to maintain and 
to promote the happiness and prosperity of his subjects. The 
Constitution of Prince Shotoku provides: “The officers of 
the government are also the subjects of the prince [Emperor], 
and there is no reason why they should dare to lay undue 
burden upon others—the people, who are the subjects of the 
same prince [Emperor]. 20 ” When intelligent men take ser¬ 
vice, the applause of the people follows; but when the un¬ 
intelligent are in office, calamities ensue. If wise officers are 
chosen, the matters of the State are well managed, the com¬ 
munity is free from danger, and prosperity prevails. 21 To 

18 Uyehara, Nippon Minken Hattatsu Shi, p. 458. (This may not be true if the 
press and public opinion are behind the party.) 

19 Imperial Ordinance concerning the House of Representatives, Article LI. 

20 The Constitution of Prince Shotoku, Chapter II; Dai Nihonshi, Vol. XII. (This 
constitution was written about Seventh Century, B. C.) 

21 The Constitution of Prince Shotoku, Chapter VII. 


The Legislative Department 23 

allow the Emperor to be cognizant of the dissatisfaction and 
suffering of his beloved subjects is considered disloyal’on the 
part of the Ministers. Hence, whenever the Diet is dissatisfied 
with the policy of the administration, it presents an address 
to the Emperor, pointing out certain defects and unsatisfactory 
conditions in the government, and making the Cabinet Min¬ 
isters appear to the people as thwarting the will of the Emperor. 
Unless they are able to refute the charges made against them, 
the Ministers will suffer public discredit. Moreover, since 
they are considered as Ministers or advisers of the Emperor, 
who is always anxious to promote the happiness of his subjects, 
the Ministers must either prove that the action of the House 
is wrong or acknowledge their own defects. To do the former 
is to defy the House by a dissolution, and appeal to the country 
for its judgment or decision. To do the latter is to tender 
their individual or joint resignation. 22 Indeed, six dissolutions 
out of ten in thirty years of parliamentary history since 1890 
were directly or indirectly the result of an address of the House 
of Representatives impeaching the Cabinet. 

Although the Houses are given some powers over the matters 
enumerated in the Constitution these powers are limited in 
the sphere of their operation. The House may refuse by major¬ 
ity vote to approve a legislative proposition; but even in its 
negative sense, it is to be observed that they can not prevent 
the execution of any laws already enacted by refusing to ap¬ 
prove the necessary appropriations. If these appropriations 
are not made by the chambers, the government—the advisers 
of the Emperor—are generally conceded to have the consti¬ 
tutional right to raise and expend what funds are necessary 
in order to carry out the laws already upon the statute books. 
Article LXVII says, “Those expenditures already fixed, 
based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to 

22 Cabinet Ministers in Japan have not collective responsibility as in England, as 
the writer has already said elsewhere. Therefore it is not necessary for all Ministers 
to resign at once as a unit. Sometimes the Minister who has been most subjected to 
popular criticism tenders his resignation while the rest remain in the office. This was 
the case during the administration of Okuma. 




24 Democracy and Japanese Government 

the Emperor, and such expenditures as may have arisen by 
effect of law or that appertain to the legal obligations of the 
government, shall be neither rejected nor reduced by the 
Imperial Diet without the concurrence of the government.” 
This means that, if the legislature will not pass the measures 
proposed by the executive, the latter gets on just as well with¬ 
out them. 

The upshot of this provision is that under no conceivable 
circumstances can the Diet withhold the funds necessary 
to enable the government to exercise its functions. 23 It is 
true that, when the government’s budget fails to pass the 
Diet, a certain amount of embarrassment may ensue, particu¬ 
larly if the government has some large-scale project to under¬ 
take. But even so, the difficulties may not be so great as 
might be expected, since the expenditures of the government 
which do not come in the list annually voted in the Budget 
are of very wide range. These, according to Prince Ito, 
include ordinary expenditures required by the organization 
of the different branches of the administration and by that 
of the Army and Navy; the salaries of all civil and military 
officers, and expenditures that may be required inconsequence 
of treaties concluded with foreign countries; the expenses 
of the Houses of the Diet, annual allowances and other mis¬ 
cellaneous allowances to the members, pensions, annuities, 
expenses and salaries required by the organization of offices 
determined by law, and other expenses of a like nature; and 
expenditures relative to the interest of the national debt, 
redemption of the same, subsidies or guarantees to companies, 
expenses necessitated by the civil obligation of the govern¬ 
ment, and compensations of all kinds, and the like. 24 From 
this list it is apparent that a large part of the expenditures 
of the state is permanently provided for by the Constitution. 
Moreover, the government has means of raising the revenue 

23 Article LXXI. When the Diet fails to vote on the Budget, the Government shall 
carry out the Budget of the preceding year. 

24 Commentaries, pp. 128-129. 


25 


The Legislative Department 

by the imposition of administrative fees, or other charges having 
the nature of compensation, such as railway fares, warehouse 
charges, school fees, and the like, which are fixed by adminis¬ 
trative ordinance. 20 These fees which escape the direct control 
of the Diet, according to Professor Uyehara, amounted to 
about a third of the total ordinary revenue during the year 
I 9°5“ I 9 I b. 26 Thus the Japanese theory of the Budget is based 
upon the doctrine that, inasmuch as only the will of the Em¬ 
peror is competent to create law, the Diet cannot, by its 
action, defeat the operation of law. 

Though the members of the Diet have legal power to intro¬ 
duce bills, this has not been exercised to any great extent. A 
majority of its members are not well trained in drawing up 
any bill which requires particularly technical knowledge. In 
this respect the experienced government officials have far 
superior qualifications. The handicaps imposed by the law 
and custom of the Constitution also discourage the members 
of the Houses from attempting to secure legislation by private 
bills. At present no important government bill is introduced 
without first being submitted to the Privy Council. In case 
of a private bill, the members of the Diet can not submit 
it to the Council, because they have no connection with that 
body. Under such circumstances the members of the Diet 
are loath to trouble themselves by introducing a bill which is 
very likely not to receive the approval of the Privy Council. 
Moreover, the Emperor has the veto power which he can exer¬ 
cise freely if he wishes to. Such laws as receive Imperial sanc¬ 
tion must, according to the Constitution, be promulgated 
before the next session of the Diet. However, this does not 
mean that laws must be enforced immediately after entry 
in the statute books, because the enforcement of any law 
involves expense. And until an item covering such an expen¬ 
diture has been put into the Budget by the government 
and approved by the Diet, the laws will be ineffective. Thus, 


25 Article LII, Commentaries, p. 114. 

20 Dr. Uyehara, Political Development of Japan, p. 144. 


26 


Democracy and Japanese Government 


the Factory Law of 1910 was not enforced until 1916. 27 In 
the same way the Foreigner’s Land Ownership Act which passed 
several years ago has still no effect as a law. 28 

The shortness of the session of the Diet and the power of the 
government reduce still further the actual power of the houses. 
The government can minimize criticism and inquiries by sus¬ 
pending the sittings of the Representatives of the people. The 
length of the annual session as fixed by the constitutional 
provision 29 is three months, but in the law of the Houses it 
is provided that at any time, and as often as it wishes, the 
Cabinet may prorogue either house for a period not exceeding 
fifteen days. 30 Such a suspension may be used by the govern¬ 
ment as a warning that continued recalcitrancy will result in 
a dissolution—dissolution which involves an enormous expense 
to the Representatives of the people. 

Further curtailment of the power of the Houses is brought 
about by cutting short the length of the annual session. The 
Houses meet the latter part of December. In practice the 
real work begins after taking about a month’s recess for the 
New Year’s holiday, that is, sometime about the 25th of 
January. Moreover, by the rules of procedure of the Lower 
House a further diminution of the actual time for debate or 
investigation is effected. 

Plenary sittings of the House take place on alternate days. 31 
Committee meetings 32 occupy the rest of the time. The actual 
time occupied by the sittings of the Lower House since its 
foundation in 1890 was, until the twenty-sixth session, eighty- 
three days and twenty-seven hours. 33 Full sittings of the 
House do not exceed thirty days. 

Such is the operation of the legislative organs in Japan. To 
democratize the legislative system the Constitution must be 

27 Dr. I. Takami, Meaning of National Census, Chuo Korort, p. 2, March, 1918. 

28 Tokyo, Nichi Nichi, March, 1919, p. 2. 

29 Article XLII. 

80 Law of Houses, Article XXXIII. 

31 Japan Year Book, 1918, p. 639. 

32 Ibid, 667. (Year 1915.) 

33 Ibid, 1918, p. 639. 



The Executive Department 


27 


either amended or interpreted in a new way. So long as this 
is not done, the Diet can not obtain substantial powers in 
legislation, and can not enforce responsibility upon the Cabinet. 
It is hardly possible that any extensive change can occur 
unless the franchise is greatly extended. 


Chapter III 


DEMOCRACY AND THE JAPANESE ELECTION 

LAW BEFORE 1919 

The original Election Law of Japan was enacted in 1889, 
the year of the promulgation of the Constitution. The Con¬ 
stitution, which is extremely difficult to amend, is silent as 
to the provision for suffrage. Whether this was due to the 
wisdom of the framers of the Constitution or was by mere 
accident of imitation, the Election Law of Japan is fortunately 
amendable by the ordinary legislative process. "It is not 
proper,” says I to, one of the constitutional framers, "that the 
Constitution should provide for such detailed matters as laws 
of election which are subject to change whenever necessity 
requires them.” 1 

The Law of 1889 was undemocratic in that high property 
qualifications were placed both upon the electorate and the 
candidates. The principle laid down in the law was that 
only those who showed "sufficient evidence of attachment 
to the community were entitled to suffrage.” However, this 
evidence consisted in the possession of a certain amount of 
property, preferably real estate. In discussing the subject 
of suffrage, Dr. Yegi says in his book Ideal Constitutionalism 
that the political philosophy of universal suffrage is a mere 
fallacy. He considers that those who possess no property 
should not be active participants in political life. 2 Dr. Uyesugi 
entertains a similar opinion. “Generally speaking,” he says, 
"only those who have a definite amount of property have a 
definite opinion, and they alone have any chance to equip 

1 Ito, Constitutional Law and the Law of the Imperial House of Japan, p. 32. 

2 See his last page as well as his article regarding election of members of the House. 
He says on the last page, referring to the common people, “Are you still dreaming of 
human rights and liberty? If you live, you should be satisfied with that. As long as 
you have no actual power, your complaints have no effect upon us. You ought not 
to try to disturb the feeling of the bureaucrats. You should pray for us. It is the 
best policy to be in peace under the protection of the bureaucrats.” 


29 


Election Law before igig 

themselves with education and common sense. If there is 
no restriction in the way of a qualification for voters, those 
who have no property and no education, as they far exceed 
in number, will make our national assembly far from ideal.” 3 

In accordance with this philosophy the accepted idea of 
those who drafted this law of 1889 was that only the property¬ 
holding class should enjoy political rights. Thus the statute 
provided that “the elector must have been paying, in the Fu 
or Ken, for not less than one year previous to the date of the 
making out of the electoral list, direct national taxes to the 
amount of not less than fifteen yen, and must be still paying 
the same. But in the case of income tax, he must have been 
paying for not less than three full years previous to the same 
date, and must be still paying.” 4 

The result of this provision was that the voting population 
was only 450,365. 5 The population of Japan in 1889 was 39,- 
382,200; there was, therefore, about one voter in every 87.7 
persons. 6 

The same principle was applied in the requirement of 
property qualifications for the legislative candidates. It was 
provided that “those alone shall be eligible who are male 
Japanese subjects of not less than thirty years of age, and who 
in the Fu or Ken in which they desire to be elected, have been 
paying direct national taxes to an amount not less than fifteen 
yen one year previous to the date of the making out of the 
electoral list, and who are still paying that amount of direct 
national taxes.” 7 The result of this provision was that par¬ 
ticipation in political life was limited to the most prosperous 
part of the population. 

Another feature of the original law was the requirement 
of publicity in voting. Article XXXVIII provided “every 

3 Professor Uyesugi, Imperial Constitution, 7th edition, p. 404. 

4 Article VIII. Election Law of 1889. 

5 Professor Kudo, Constitutional History, p. 343 (statistics of Meiji 21). 

6 Professor Kudo, Kenpo Hattatsu Shi (History of Constitutional Development), 

P. 344 - 

7 Article VIII. 


30 Democracy and Japanese Government 

voter shall, at the voting place, inscribe upon the voting 
paper, the name of the person he votes for, then his own 
name and residence, and shall put a stamp upon it.” This 
had to be done in the presence of the election officers. This 
open voting facilitated bribery since the briber could ascertain 
afterwards how any man voted. Another result was that 
persons economically connected, or in friendly association, 
with others were often coerced into voting as those others 
bade them. 

Under the first election law, the system of small electoral 
districts was adopted, and each Fu or Ken (administrative 
district) was divided into several election districts, each of 
which constituted a single-member constituency, with the 
exception of some large districts which, because incapable 
of further division on account of their topography, had two 
seats alloted with the system of scrutin de liste. There were 
257 districts in all, and the number of representatives to be 
elected out of those districts was 300. 

It seems that the framers of the Election Law were not 
fully aware of the effect of the Law upon the real operation 
of the Constitution. They constructed election districts 
based on a principle of administrative convenience rather 
than on any principle of a political nature, without seriously 
considering the distribution of voters having the property 
qualification. They sirqply allotted to each district one or 
two representatives at the rate of one representative to every 
120,000 people. 8 To those districts which had a population of 
between 100,000 and 200,000 was assigned one seat; to those 
which had a population of between 200,000 and 300,000 
were alloted two seats. 9 But the defect in this division as a 
result of the property qualification was that the population 
was by no means proportionate to the number of voters. 

8 Professor Kudo, History of Constitutional Development, Vol. I, p. 342. 

9 Hayashida, Senkyo Kaise Iken, Kokuminno Tomo, 1892, No. 198, Shimane-ken, 
6th electoral district had only 52 voters; Kagoshima-ken, 7th district, 53; Nagasaki- 
ken, 6th district, 55; Fukushima-ken, 5th district, 4,295; Shiga-ken, 2nd district, 
4,379; Mie-ken, 3rd district, 4,568. 


3i 


Election Law before igig 

Certain electoral districts were able to elect one representative 
with 52 or 53 votes, while other one member constituencies 
had to elect their respective representatives with more than 
4,300 votes. 10 Owing to this disproportionate distribution 
of votes in election districts it often happened that a minority 
of the voters, instead of a majority, in certain Fus or Kens 
obtain the majority of the members returned; and, on the 
other hand, a party with a majority of the votes at the polls 
sometimes secured only a very small minority of the repre¬ 
sentatives. For instance, in the first General Election in the 
Prefecture of Yehime, the Liberals had five seats with 3,260 
votes, while the Progressives secured only two seats with 
3,540 votes. 11 In the fourth General Election, the ultra- 
Conservatives (Kokumin Kiokwai) in the Prefecture of 
Fukuoka succeeded in securing five seats with 7,442 votes, 
while the Liberals (Jiyu-to) in the same prefecture secured 
only four with 10,451 votes. 12 

The following table gives a general idea of election results 
under the original system: 13 


Election of March, 1898 





Number of 


Number of 

Number of 

Votes per 


Votes Cast 

Representatives 

Representative 

Liberal Party. 

101,087 

87 

1,162 

Progressive Party . *. . . . 

86,712 

67 

1,294 

People’s Party. 

20,695 

20 

1,035 

Seiyukai. 

3.815 

7 

545 

New Liberal Party .... 

4.375 

3 

L 459 

East-North Union Club . . 

2,353 

2 

M77 

Aitsu Doshikai. 

872 

2 

437 

Tsukuzen Kyokai. 

3.291 

1 

3,291 

Kokuken-to ....... 

1.330 

1 

L 330 

Mushozuku, Unattached 

112,881 

IIO 

1,026 


10 Hayashida, Senkyo Kaise Iken, Kokuminno Tomo, 1892, No. 198. 

11 Senkyo Kaisei, Kokumin Shinbum, July 8, 1899; Hayashida, Senkyo Ho Shakugi, 
Appendix, p. 33; Uyehara, Political Development of Japan, p. 171. 

12 Hayashida, Senkyo Ho Shakugi, Appendix, p. 33. 

13 Nippon Teikoku Dai, No. 17 Tokei Nenkwan Meiji 31, p. 1,078. 









32 


Democracy and Japanese Government 


Election of August, 1898 


Constitutional. 

264,267 

196 

'.348 

Progressive. 

12,386 

8 

1.548 

Seiyukai. 

3.501 

7 

500 

People’s Party. 

8,664 

7 

1,238 

Kokuken-to. 

7 ,ii 9 

6 

1,187 

Liberal . 

3,469 

2 

L 735 

Party affiliation uncertain . 

94,732 

68 

L 393 

No party. 

6,463 

6 

1,077 


Another characteristic of the original law was the dispro¬ 
portionate representation of different classes of people in the 
House of Representatives, owing to the property qualification 
imposed upon the candidates. At the time when the first 
General Election was held, land taxes were the main source 
of revenue, amounting to about two-thirds of the direct na¬ 
tional taxes. It is interesting to note here that in 1890, the 
year in which the first General Election was held, the tax- 
paying capacity of representatives ranged from 15 yen to 
2,230 yen. The average was 125 yen for each member. 14 
As a result of this property qualification, the great majority 
of both voters and candidates were of the agrarian class. 
Moreover, as municipalities had no separate independent 
electoral districts except the large cities of Tokyo, Osaka, and 
Kyoto, the rural voters and their candidates had a further 
advantage. The result was that a majority of the representa¬ 
tives in the House were those representing the agrarian class. 
According to Mr. Hayashida, there were only seventeen out 
of the three hundred members of the House, who really repre¬ 
sented the interest of the urban population. 15 The following 
figures 16 give a general idea of how the rural and the urban 
interests were represented. 

14 Professor Kudo, History of Constitutional Development, p. 344. 

16 Hayashida, Senkio Shakugi, Appendix, p. 163; Uyehara, p. 172. 

16 Quoted directly from Kokumin Nenkwan Taisei Gonene, pp. 112-113. 









Election Law before igig 


33 


1 2 3 4 5 6 

2 — — I I 2 


Under the Original Law 
Sessions 

Manufacture. 

Fishing. 

Farmers.. 

Commercial. 

Mining. 

Liquor . 

Landowners. 

Physicians and pharmacists . . . 

Bankers. 

Company officials. 

Newspaper reporters and magazine 

writers. 

Teachers . 

Lawyers. 

Public officials. 

Authors. 

Miscellaneous. 

No occupation. 

Total . 

Under the Revised Law of 1900 


Sessions 7 

Farmers.120 

Commercial. 33 

Manufacture. 2 

Fishing. — 

Mining. 7 

Liquor . 7 

Landowners. — 

Physicians and pharmacists 10 

Bankers. 19 

Company officials. 10 

Newspaper reporters and 
magazine writers .... 9 

Teachers ........ 4 

Lawyers. 3 1 

Public officials. 10 

Authors. 2 

Miscellaneous. 14 

No occupation. 78 

Total .37 6 


1 


129 

144 

137 

155 

128 

134 

19 

25 

24 

29 

32 

24 

I 

1 

1 

2 

4 

3 

— 

2 

1 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

15 

11 

3 

3 

3 

1 

4 

3 

4 

3 

4 

5 

4 

6 

7 

7 

9 

6 

9 

13 

8 

12 

10 

12 

7 

4 

— 

— 

— 

— 

1 

1 

20 

22 

28 

21 

22 

24 

12 

6 

2 

6 

2 

17 

1 

2 

1 

— 

1 

— 

20 

13 

1 

— 

13 

4 

JA 

59 

J 1 

62 

47 

50 

300 

300 

300 

300 

300 

300 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

129 

129 

105 

80 

81 

79 

35 

39 

33 

16 

32 

19 

2 

— 

— 

3 

8 

. 8 

1 

3 

5 

4 

5 

6 

7 

3 

6 

10 

6 

9 

5 

5 

1 

5 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

— 

9 

3 

7 

6 

4 

15 

16 

12 

7 

15 

14 

8 

13 

18 

20 

57 

5 i 

53 

8 

13 

17 

22 

5 i 

28 

3 

3 

3 

3 

5 

6 

54 

59 

64 

61 

54 

56 

6 

5 

8 

12 

8 

1 

3 

5 

1 

— 

— 

— 

13 

8 

14 

11 

11 

16 

73 

74 

88 

76 

73 

73 

376 

379 

379 

38 i 

381 

381 11 


17 Quoted directly from Kokumin Nenkwan, pp. 137-138. 1919- 










































34 


Democracy and Japanese Government 


From the foregoing table it can easily be seen that even 
after thirty years, although the population of cities has been 
increasing by leaps and bounds, the rural interests are still 
protected by a large majority of so-called country gentlemen. 
Such being the case, it is not strange that there has been no 
democratic social legislation enacted in the interest of the 
large majority of urban working men and women. 

It was evident from the very beginning that the Law of 
1889 was not satisfactory. Its defects became more pronounced 
at each successive election. There were constant movements 
among the liberal politicians to amend the legislation. It 
was not, however, until the year 1895 that an electoral reform 
bill was introduced by private members into the House of 
Representatives. The bill proposed to extend the franchise 
by lowering the property qualification of both electors and 
candidates from fifteen yen of direct national taxes to five 
yen, and in the case of the income tax to three yen, and also 
by reducing the age qualification from twenty-five to twenty 
for the voter, and from thirty to twenty-five for the candidate. 
If the bill had passed, the number of voters would have been 
quadrupled. The bill, however, was opposed by the govern¬ 
ment, and, although it passed the Lower House of the legislature 
by a large majority, it was rejected by the Upper House. Three 
years later another electoral reform bill was introduced into 
the House of Representatives by the government under the 
premiership of I to, notwithstanding the fact that it was his 
former cabinet that opposed the reform bill of 1895. This 
introduction by the same premier who opposed the former 
reform act was due to the fact that Ito wished to mitigate the 
political antagonism toward the government. 

The bill proposed a more radical reform of the election law 
than did that of 1895. The principles involved were: (1) the 
extension of the franchise by reducing the property qualifica¬ 
tions of electors; (2) the creation of independent electoral 
districts for municipalities; (3) an increase in the number of 
representatives from 300 to 472; (4) the abolition of the 


35 


Election Law before 1919 

property and residential qualifications of the candidates; 
(5) the adoption of large electoral districts combined with the 
principle of a single non-transferable vote. 18 Had this bill 
become law it would have increased the number of voters 
from 450,465 to 2,000,000. 19 Though it was passed by the 
Lower House, it did not go to the other House because the House 
was dissolved on account of the rejection of a most important 
government bill for increasing the land tax. 

In 1899, a bill which was not substantially different from 
Ito’s, was brought into the House of Representatives by the 
Yamagata Cabinet. The bill, after prolonged discussion, was 
passed by the Lower House, with certain amendments, the most 
important of which concerned the property qualification of 
the elector. The bill was modified in such a way as to increase 
the amount of direct national taxes other than the land tax 
from three yen to five, and to reduce the number of seats 
allotted to municipal districts from ninety-eight to seventy- 
three. As we have already seen, the great majority of the 
House was representative of rural interests. Consequently 
it was but natural for it to oppose any scheme which would 
increase the political strength of the urban population. 

The bill came to a deadlock in the Upper House, and after 
prolonged debate it was restored to its original state. 20 There¬ 
upon committees were chosen from both Houses to settle the 
matter, but without reaching a compromise the conference 
broke up, and the bill was laid on the table sine die. 

In the following session of the House, the bill was again 
introduced by the same cabinet, and it was passed by both 
Houses with an important amendment by the Upper House. 
The property qualification of the elector was raised from five 
yen direct national taxes to ten yen. 

It seems almost incomprehensible that the same House 
which in the previous session so persistently opposed undemo¬ 
cratic amendments made by the Peers to an identical bill 

18 Senkyo Ho Kaise An, 1898. 

19 Speech by I to on the Electoral Reform Bill in the House of Representatives. 

20 Kudo, Tiekoku Gikaishi, Vol. II, pp. 120-124. 


36 Democracy and Japanese Government 

would accept this important change which was to reduce 
the number of voters by about one-half. The possible reasons, 
Dr. Uyehara thinks, were three: first, the inability of the 
majority of the members of the House to realize the effect of the 
amendment upon the electorate; second, the indifference of 
the people directly benefited by the lower property qualifica¬ 
tion; third, the united support of the Liberal Party. 21 Pro¬ 
fessor Uyehara continues: 

The fact that the majority of members in the House of Repre¬ 
sentatives did not realize the full force of the amendment is shown 

by the absence of any discussion on the vital point of the effect of 

« 

a greatly extended franchise upon national politics and the working 
of the Constitution. It seems to me from the parliamentary bills 
introduced into the House, that a large number of the members 
did not consider the problem of the extension of the franchise any 
more seriously than does a simple-minded woman demanding the 
franchise on the principle of “no taxation without representation” 
considers the problem of woman suffrage. Besides, as it was chiefly 
the politicians, not the people, who urged an extension of the 
franchise, the majority in the House could decide the limit of that 
extension at their own capricious will, without fear of conflict with 
public opinion. Then, too, the Liberal Party, which had fought 
bitterly with the Peers over minor points in the previous session, 
changed its policy, and, accepting the amendment, voted for the 
Bill en bloc , while the Conservative government, which had intro¬ 
duced the Bill at the request of the Liberal Party, made no objec¬ 
tion, the extension of franchise being more limited by the amend¬ 
ment than in the original bill. So the Bill was passed and became 
a law. 22 

Thus after heated discussion in three successive sessions, 
an electoral law was passed. 

This law of 1900 adopted the system of large districts 
combined with the principle of a single non-transferable vote 
(that is, giving a voter in each district but one vote for one 
candidate), as well as that of secret voting, and it created inde¬ 
pendent electoral districts for municipalities having a popula- 

21 Dr. Uyehara, Political Development of Japan, p. 177. 

22 Dr. Uyehara, Political Development of Japan, p. 178. 


37 


Election Law before 1919 

tion of over 30,000. 23 The country was divided into forty- 
seven large (rural) districts making each prefectural adminis¬ 
tration a unit; to each was allotted from two to twelve seats 
according to population. 24 Sixty-one urban electoral districts 
were created, to each of which was allotted one seat except 
the districts of Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Nagoya, and Yokohama 
which were given eleven, six, three, two and two seats respect¬ 
ively. The number of representatives was increased from 300 
to 376 25 while the number of voters increased from 450,365 26 
to 983,193. 27 The property qualification for legislative candi¬ 
dates was also abolished, thus widening the opportunity for 
young men of ability to enter public life. 

Another reform enacted by this law was the abolition of 
residential qualifications for the candidate. This was important 
because it gave the opportunity to a man of prominence to 
run from another district when he was likely to lose in his 
own district. Under the original system of residential qualifica¬ 
tion, even such a prominent man as Mr. Matsuda, who was 
once a Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
Minister of Finance in the Saionji Cabinet, suffered several 
defeats because he was unable to run from another district. 28 
Moreover the system of a large electoral district under the 
law gave to the voter independence and freedom from the 
rule of the party machine. It did not abolish parties; it 
recognized them. But it permitted new alignments and group¬ 
ings of individuals within and without existing parties at the 
expense of the iron-bound classification imposed by the modern 
highly developed party machine. It gave to men of inde¬ 
pendent mind and character a better opportunity to maintain 

23 The Election Law of 1900, Article I, XXIX, XXXVI, Appendix VIII, X, or 
Shinhorei No. 24, May, 1918, Supplementary Issue of Taiyo, p. 69. 

24 One representative in rural districts for every 130,000 persons, ibid. 

25 This number increased by three in 1904 by having given three seats to Hokkaido 
and later in 1912 additional two seats were added by allowing Okinawa-Ken to choose 
two representatives. The number of representatives was 381 until 1920. 

26 Based on first General Election. 

27 This number is based on the first election after the promulgation of the New 
Electoral Law.— Nippon-Teikoku Nenkwan No. 36, p. 644. 

28 Humphreys, Proportional Representation, p. 288. 


38 Democracy and Japanese Government 

their seats in the House, for in the election they might, in 
spite of opposition of parties, draw their votes from all parts 
within a large electoral district, and it might be said that the 
larger the electoral district, the greater was opportunity of 
independent candidates. It was largely due to this fact that 
Mr. Osaki and Mr. Shimada, by being independent candidates, 
have never lost their seats in Parliament. 29 However, at 
present throughout Japan, as a matter of custom, it is the 
unwritten law that a candidate runs from his native prefecture 
or town; and the rule is practically self-operating, for it is 
next to impossible for any candidate to run successfully in 
another electoral district unless he is unusually prominent. 
This is especially so in a country like Japan where campaign 
speeches have not much weight with the voters because the 
majority of them are not politically educated. It is but natural 
that the voters cast their votes, not so much with a particular 
political idea in mind, as from personal considerations. This 
is the reason that private canvassing is more effective in Japan. 
It appeals directly to the voters. 

The result of the large electoral district system was of no 
mean value; it was a marked improvement over the small 
electoral district on the single constituency principle. Yet, 
in spite of this advance, the system lacked elasticity and adapta¬ 
bility. The single vote, like the cumulative vote and the 
limited vote, required exact calculations on the part of the 
party organization, which otherwise might fail to secure for 
its party the maximum number of representatives. The 
number of candidates to be nominated depended upon a 
careful calculation on the part of the political organization 
as to the exact number of their probable supporters; and 
when the nominations had been made, efforts had to be taken 
by the party organizations to allot their support to their candi¬ 
dates in such a way that not one of them was in danger of 
defeat. Since the nomination of too many candidates would, 
as with the limited vote, be disastrous, parties have been un- 

*® Taisei Gonen Kokumin Nenkwan, section Gendai Jinbutsu, pp. 24-107. 


Election Law before 1919 39 

willing to nominate more than the number of candidates 
who are absolutely necessary, in order to prevent the scattering 
of votes. The defeat of the Seiyukai in Tokyo in the election 
campaign of 1908 was attributed to the non-limitation of 
the number of candidates. 30 The result was that the Seyukai 
secured only two seats with 6,579 votes while the Daido-ha 
(Conservative) elected an equal number of representatives 
with 2,879 votes. 31 

The defeat of the Seiyukai in the general election of May 
1920, in the city of Tokyo was also the result of the non¬ 
limitation of the candidates. The result of the election is as 


follows: 



Party 

Number of 

Number of 


Votes 

Members Elected 

Seiyukai. 

. . . . 21,318 

3 

Kenseikai. 

.... 19,136 

6 

Kokuminto. 

.... I 545 I 

4 

Mushozuku (or unclassified) . . . 

.... 14,506 

432 


As to the qualifications of a candidate, the revised law of 
1900 remained substantially the same as the old law of 1889 
except in those particulars which have already come under 
discussion. Among the classes still specifically excluded are 
the peers, clergy, army, navy, certain office-holders, 33 bank¬ 
rupts, and persons convicted of treason, felony, or corrupt 
practice. As to the meaning of the phrase “office-holder” 
there has been some controversy recently among Japanese 
politicians. Article XVI provides that “officials other than 
those enumerated in the preceding article 34 may, so long as 
their official functions are not thereby interfered with, serve 
with membership in the House of Representatives, retaining 
their official position.” The questions involved in the contro- 

30 J. H. Humphreys, Proportional Representation, p. 284. 

31 Ibid, p. 285. 

32 Tokyo, Asahi, p. 3, May 18, 1920. 

33 and 34 Article XV—Officials in the Imperial Household Department, Officials of 
Justice, Chiefs and Judges of the Administrative Litigation Court, Auditors, Revenue 
Officials, and Police Officials. 






40 Democracy and Japanese Government 

versy are, first, who can determine whether serving as a member 
in the House is detrimental to the other position which a rep¬ 
resentative holds, and second, whether persons in the service 
of the commune and of the government school are excluded. 
These questions still await definite answers, though during 
recent years it seems quite settled that teachers in both govern¬ 
ment and private institutions may serve as members of the 
legislature, holding at the same time their original positions. 
Thus Dr. Ogawa has been serving as a member of the legislature 
and at the same time has been holding his professorship in the 
University of Kyoto. Mr. Horita has accepted a position as 
secretary to the Minister of the Treasury, retaining his seat 
in the House. 35 Although the statute prohibits any member of 
a Fu or Ken (prefecture) Assembly from combining his office 
with membership in the House of Representatives, 36 it seems 
to be conceded that the mayor of a city may do so. 37 Thus, 
Mr. Ozaki was at one time serving as mayor of Tokyo as well 
as a member of the House of Representatives. However, with 
these exceptions, the clause has never been clearly defined. 
An able, conservative political writer, Dr. Uyesugi, explains 
the meaning of the clause by saying that a man can hold his 
seat in the House of Representatives together with his official 
position until he is notified by his superior officer that his 
services are no longer needed. “In this case,” he says, “one 
must decide whether he will resign his official position or 
accept membership in the House.” 38 The practical operation 
of the Article, however, is that when a man has been chosen 
for membership in the House by the votes of his fellow citizens 
who hold the same political views as the authorities (for in¬ 
stance, the Cabinet) in power, he may not, in the exercise of 
the functions that have been assigned to him, be hindered 
by any superior, (for instance, the governor). This is especially 

35 In the Hara Cabinet, 1918. The information has been furnished by Mr. Sugiyama, 
correspondent of Osaka Mainichi. 

36 Article XVII, Election Law of 1900. 

37 The position of mayor is not regarded as a government position. 

38 Dr. Uyesugi, Constitution and Constitutional Government, 2nd edition, p. 445. 


4i 


Election Law before igig 

so since in Japan most higher officials are directly appointed 
by the central authority in power. Of course any contro¬ 
versy such as this may come up before the Administrative 
Court, but it must be remembered that even the Administra¬ 
tive Court is under the influence of the political authority 
in power. 

So far as the abolition of property as well as residential 
qualifications for the candidates is concerned, the revised 
law of 1900 was a marked advance toward democracy. How¬ 
ever, the law did not democratize the qualifications of the voter 
except that it reduced the tax-paying requirement from fifteen 
yen of direct national taxes to ten yen. 39 

Besides the property qualification, the Election Law also 
provided a residential qualification. Article VIII says: “He 
must be a male Japanese subject and be not less than full 
twenty-five years of age. He must have had his permanent 
residence in the election district for not less than one year 
previous to the date of the drawing-up of the electoral list.” 
This residence qualification seems universal at present. The 
mobility of population makes it necessary to have residence 
qualifications to prevent fraud. However, the mobility of 
population was very slow at the time when the Election Law 
was promulgated and such a requirement of long residence 
qualification seemed almost unnecessary. 40 

Certain persons were excluded from voting, though possess¬ 
ing the general qualifications above mentioned. The Law 
designated the following limitations: (1) Those who have been 
declared bankrupt and have not yet fulfilled their obligations, 
or those who have been declared to be in process of liquidation 
or to be insolvent and who have not yet definitely rehabilitated 
themselves; (2) those who have been declared incompetent 
or quasi-incompetent; (3) those who have been deprived of 

39 Article XVIII. 

40 The rate of increase of population during the ten years just prior to the promulga¬ 
tion of the revised law was an average of 10.03 per 1,000 persons, while the rate of 
increase during five years beginning with 1909 was 14.78 per 1,000 .—Nippon Teikoku 
No. 36 Tokei Nenkwan, 1918, pp. 20-21. 


42 Democracy and Japanese Government 

civil rights or whose civil rights are suspended. 41 However, 
in case the civil rights are suspended or withdrawn on account 
of political misdemeanor or crime, the right to vote revives 
as soon as the penalty imposed has been paid or remitted 
through pardon. 

Perhaps one of the most peculiar features of the Japanese 
Electoral Law, interesting to Occidentals, although found 
also in the German Electoral Law, is the disqualification of 
the clergy. 42 The objection to permitting the clergy to partici¬ 
pate in public affairs seemed to be founded upon the waning 
notion that their profession is of so sacred a character that it 
is a profanation of it to allow the clergy to mingle in the secular 
affairs of the community. This is an idea that belongs to a 
past age rather than to the present, although it is probably 
shared by many pious persons. 

By the practice of most of the religious bodies in Japan, 
the ministers of the respective denominations are deemed to 
be consecrated to the work of the ministry, and to be under 
obligation to make that the principal business of their lives. 
If they engage in secular employments inconsistent with the 
performance of their duty as ministers of religion, they are 
thought to violate their professional obligations. This senti¬ 
ment has its foundation both in the generally avowed profes¬ 
sions of the clergy themselves and in the religious opinions of 
the people. But there is nothing in the mere exercise of the 
right of suffrage inconsistent with the performance of clerical 
duties or with professional obligations. The clergy of Japan 
are an enlightened, patriotic, and virtuous body of men. There 
is nothing, therefore, in their character or qualifications that 
renders them unfit for the exercise of the suffrage for the deter¬ 
mination of the national policy and the election of members 
to the House. They have no exclusive privileges and are 
subject to the same laws that govern others; and they have 
the same interest in the welfare of the country. It is therefore 

41 Article XI, section 4. 

42 Article XIII. 


Election Law before 1919 43 

unjust to them and a violation of their rights to deprive them 
of the right of suffrage. There may be good reasons why 
they should not mingle in the political strife of the day, and 
why they should not exercise their right of voting in the 
elections and in the public affairs. But this is a matter that 
ought to be determined wholly by their own sense of propriety 
and duty. 

The same restriction applies to men in the Army or in the 
Navy who are in active service, or who have been summoned 
in time of war or of emergency. 43 The provision covers officers, 
army surgeons, and the men, but it does not apply to civil 
officials of the military administration. The decisive factor 
is the conditions of active service. 

It may seem singular that in a government in which militar¬ 
ism is so influential the question should ever arise whether men 
in the Army and Navy should be excluded from the privilege 
of voting by reason of lawful and necessary employment by 
the government. There is certainly nothing in these occupa¬ 
tions that ought wholly to exclude them from the right of 
suffrage, for the majority of men in the active service are not 
serving voluntarily, but are drafted under the conscription 
law. As has been shown, however, a person must have an 
established domicile, with at least one year’s residence in the 
place, before he can be admitted to the privilege of an elector 
in that place. But a person can not, in the true interpretation 
of that rule, by his service in the Army or Navy establish his 
domicile and residence in a place necessary to qualify him 
for the right of suffrage. Indeed, a residence for any length 
of time in any place by persons engaged in the performance 
of regular military or naval duty can scarcely be considered 
as a residence. Their residence depends upon the will of 
others having authority to direct their movements, and can 
not properly be considered as an act of their own, done in 

43 Article XII. According to Mr. Higuchi, if Japan adopts the system which would 
give the ballot to the ex-soldiers, the number of voters would increase by i.ooo.ooo. 
Speech at the meeting of the advisory board of the Tokyo branch of the Kensei-kai, 
January 13, 1919- 


44 Democracy and Japanese Government 

their own right. An establishment at any place, under such 
circumstances, can not even give one a domicile there. Troops are 
stationed at various posts and garrisons throughout the country. 
They are liable to be removed from one station to another. 

In like manner the exercise of the right of suffrage is denied 
to the persons who, though otherwise entitled to vote, are not 
registered in the list of qualified voters. However, the law 
allows them to exercise the right of suffrage if non-registration 
was based on reasonable ground. It provides: “No person other 
than those entered in the electoral list shall be capable of 
voting. Should, however, any one come to the voting place 
on the day of election, bringing with them a writ entitling 
him to have his name entered on the electoral list, the voting 
overseer must permit him to vote.” 44 

The list of voters in every village, town, and city is care¬ 
fully made up and is posted for a sufficient length of time 
(fifteen days) for public inspection to enable every citizen who 
is interested to see that his name is included. Should the 
voter fail to scrutinize the list and should his name be erron¬ 
eously omitted, whether he scrutinized it or not, he may claim 
that a correction be made by giving to the Guncho or to the 
mayor (head of the administrative district) written notice 
and his reason therefore, together with corroborative evidence. 45 
However, in case he is barred from the exercise of the franchise 
through his own fault, he is only barred from that particular 
election; his right of suffrage is not lost, but merely suspended 
until the next registration. 

To be elected a member of the House the candidate must 
secure a certain percentage of votes. In regard to this the 
statute provides: “The individual who has obtained a relative 
majority of the total number of valid ballots shall be declared 
the person elected.” However, the number of the ballots ob¬ 
tained must not be less than one-fifth of the quotient obtained 
by dividing the total number of the electors entered in the 

44 Article XXXVIII. 

45 Article XXI. 


45 


Election Law before iqiq 

electoral list by the fixed number of members to be returned 
from the district. 46 In case the number of persons elected 
by this means does not come up to the required number, 
there will be held another election to fill up the deficiency. 47 
When a person elected declines or dies previous to the issue 
of the notice of election, or when his election has been invali¬ 
dated in consequence of his having been punished for some 
offence committed in connection with the election either before 
or after the issue of the notice of election, or when the election 
has been invalidated by his having been disqualified for elec¬ 
tion, the vacancy is filled from among those who obtained the 
next greatest number of ballots. 48 

It is true that the Revised Law of 1900 was a marked im¬ 
provement over the original Electoral Law. However, it 
was far from satisfactory. As years passed, the same evils 
of inequality in the distribution of seats increased. The popula¬ 
tion of Japan has increased by leaps and bounds, and there 
has been a marked movement of population from the rural 
districts to the industrial centers. The population in the year 
when the Revised Laws were promulgated was 44,825,597. 49 
This number increased to 54,142,441 by the end of 1914. 50 
In spite of this fact, no redistribution of representation was 
made until 1919. Consequently gross inequality became one 
of the chief evils of the Electoral Laws of 1900. 51 

If the redistribution had been made every ten years in 
accordance with the spirit 52 of the law, the cities alone would 
have enjoyed 112 53 representatives in 1918, instead of 76, 54 

46 Article LXX. 

47 Article LXXIV. 

48 Article LXX. 

49 Naikaku Tokei Kyoku Henbo No. 36 Tokei Nenkwan Taisei seven. 

60 Ibid, p. 21. 

51 Article CXX provides that the present number of seats shall remain effective for 
at least ten years without regard to increase or decrease of population in each electoral 
district. 

52 The law does not say the seats must be redistributed every ten years. It says 
redistribution should take place at intervals at least ten years apart. 

63 Tokyo Nichi Nichi, p. 2. February 26, 1919. 

64 Tokyo Nichi Nichi, p. 2. February 26, 1919- 


46 Democracy and Japanese Government 

an increase of 47.3 per cent., while the country districts would 
have enjoyed 352 representatives instead of 305, an increase 
of 15.4 per cent. The population of the six largest cities in 
1900, the very year when the revision of the original Election 
Law took place, was 3,074,442. 55 Though this number has 
increased to over 5,000,000 during the last nineteen years, 56 
there was no alteration in the number of seats until 1919. 
Thus while the six largest cities could elect only one member 
to every 200,000 persons, the small cities such as Marugame, 
Onomitsu, and Akita with a population of less than 35,000 57 
were also allowed to elect one representative. Moreover, 
there were twelve 58 cities which could not enjoy the privilege 
of being independent electoral districts. 

In the rural districts we find the same discrepancies though 
they were not so bad as in the urban districts. According to 
the statute, rural districts could elect one member for every 
130,000 persons. But in spite of this provision each of three 
islands was allowed to elect one member with far less popula¬ 
tion than that provided in the statute, while Okinawa and 
Hokkaido with 545,900 and 1,513,317 respectively were 
allowed to choose only two and three members. It was said 
that those two states belonged to a special category and that 
they should not have been classed equally with other provinces. 
These special cases were said to have been due to mobility of 
population, or to a low standard of wealth. Under the terms 
of the law, however, representation was based on population, 
not on wealth. 

The result was that certain districts with only 489 or 559 
voters had one seat in the House, while certain other single 
member constituencies had more than 3,770 voters. 59 For 
instance, in the thirteenth general election in the district of 
Marugame, the Kenseikai secured one representative with 

55 Naikaku Tokei, year 1918. p. 30 (based on statistics of 1898). 

66 Naikaku Tokei, p. 20 (on Population). 

67 Naikaku Tokei, p. 20. 

58 This is based on 1913 statistics of Naikaku Tokei Nenkwan. 

59 Ibid. 


47 


Election Law before igig 

131 votes, while the Kokuminto obtained one seat with more 
than 4,390 votes in the district of Osaka; in the district of 
Kirosaki-shi, the Seiyukai secured one seat with less than 
182 votes while in the district of Kyoto-shi, the Kokuminto 
secured only one vote with more than 2,480 votes. 60 

Though the people and a majority of their representatives 
were very indifferent to such vital problems as that of suf¬ 
frage, there were always a few groups of liberal politicians who 
were deeply interested in the matter. These groups introduced 
in 1911 a most democratic electoral reform bill in the Lower 
House. This was a universal manhood suffrage bill, providing 
that “every citizen of the Empire, of male sex, who has com¬ 
pleted his twenty-fifth year, is entitled to vote for the Mem¬ 
bers of the House in the electoral districts in which he has 
been domiciled for not less than one year previous to the date 
of the drawing-up of the electoral list.” 61 The bill passed the 
Lower House by an overwhelming majority, only to be rejected 
in the House of Peers by a unanimous vote. 62 Mr. Sakai, one 
of the prominent Socialists in Japan, who was arrested in 
February, 1919, in connection with the agitation for the uni¬ 
versal suffrage movement, gives a most interesting account of 
the events incident to the passage of the Bill. He says: 

In the forty-fourth year of Meiji (1911), the universal suffrage bill 
was passed by the House of Representatives by an overwhelming 
majority. This you may think a phenomenal achievement; to tell the 
truth, the success was more of a comedy than a real achievement; 
but some of the representatives approved of it for their own personal 
credit, for they would not very much oppose a movement which 
has for its object the extension of the political rights of the people. 
Now this Bill was so radical, as you can easily imagine, that many 
representatives thought that it would never pass, and they voted 
in favor of it “just for fun,” you might say. Butlo! It passed with 
an overwhelming majority. None was more astonished at this 
than the Representatives themselves. It was of course quashed in 

60 Shinbun Nenkwan, April, 1917. PP- 158-161. 

61 Osaka Asahi, Shinbun, February 17, 1911* This bil1 was introduced by Mr. 
Hinata and nineteen other members, February 15. I9 11 * 

62 The Jiji Shinbun, Kizokuin Gizuroku, March 16, 1911. 


48 Democracy and Japanese Government 

the House of Peers by a unanimous vote. But it set them thinking— 
members of parliament, the police, the powers that be, and the 
people themselves. “This is no joke/’ they said to themselves, and 
from that time on they began to behave with great circumspection. 
Police supervision of the men concerned in this movement became 
so thorough that men became shy and disassociated themselves 
from it. So the universal franchise endeavor had been quite for¬ 
gotten until this year when it was suggested that it should be 
revised. We accordingly printed circulars calling on the people 
to co-operate with us in petitioning the House on February ninth, 
and held meetings or rather tried to do both, but they were failures 
owing to police intervention. As for me, I was asked at first to take 
an active part in promoting this scheme, but I declined because I 
was afraid that being known as a socialist I might spoil the whole 
thing, and confined myself to helping in a non-public way. The 
police, suspecting that I was in the game, called at my office on the 
eighth during my absence. I was not molested, but other persons 
were summoned by the police as reported in the press. This police 
intervention had of course scared those who might otherwise be 
interested in it from taking any part in the petition plan. Now you 
have the whole history of the 1918 attempt to petition on behalf 
of the universal franchise. 63 

It is interesting to note in connection with this Bill some 
debates which took place in both chambers. Mr. Arakawa 
said: 

The government can not be conducted by theory alone, however 
much that theory may be right. It is necessary to give a practical 
rather than a theoretical reason to the people of the lower class. 
The property qualification in elections is by no means a class dis¬ 
tinction; but, as it is one of the encouragements to the people to 
reach that stage where they can exercise their political right, it is 
necessary to maintain the present system. Moreover, I do not 
agree with the framer of this Bill that universal suffrage will lessen 
. corruption in elections. 64 

Mr. Watanabe also protested against the passage of the 
Bill. “It is wrong/’ he said, “to think that the extension of the 
right of suffrage means extension of human right. If we con- 

63 T. Sakai’s interview with the reporter of the Japan Advertiser, February 12, 1918. 

64 Parliamentary Debate, March 15, 1911 —Jiji Shimpo, March 16, 1911. 


Election Law before 191Q 49 

sider suffrage as a human right, it would be necessary for 
women to have it too. But the argument for universal suffrage 
seems not to be based on this principle. Besides, the argument 
that the Bill will diminish corruption as well as the expense 
of election has no real foundation.” 65 When this Bill passed 
the House of Representatives, the government issued a warn¬ 
ing to the public through the government agent, Mr. Yasuhiro, 
It reads: 

The Bill is to change the present system of restrictive qualifica¬ 
tions of suffrage. This principle is based on the extraordinarily 
dangerous idea which had been prevailing for a time in Europe, 
known as an inalienable human right, but such a theory has already 
lost its power. No person has the right of suffrage from his birth. 
It is clear that the right of suffrage is a privilege given by the govern¬ 
ment. Even if there are doubts on this point, they are to be found 
only in democratic countries, not in monarchical countries, and 
much less in a country like ours where the foundation of this con¬ 
stitutional government is entirely different from constitutional 
governments in Europe; such is not the system to be adopted at all. 
If such a system should be adopted in this country, our idea of the 
election would only be lowered, not raised; and it might be im¬ 
possible to select the best that the country has to offer. The final 
result of this will be the dictation of the lower over the upper class. 
The government will use every means to oppose such a bill. 66 

The Bill which passed the Lower House was laid before the 
House of Peers where it was rejected unanimously without 
any debate worth mentioning. However, it is interesting to 
note here a statement made by Mr. Hozumi, a prominent 
conservative and constitutional writer, in answer to the ques¬ 
tion made by Mr. Ohoki as to the reason for the Committee’s 
rejection of the Bill. 

In reading the Parliamentary records of the Lower House, I have 
not found a single necessity for changing the present status of the 
Election Law. As the question of reform of the suffrage is only a 
matter of convenience, there is no particular reason why this must 
be permanent, and why it must not be changed. However, I do 


65 Ibid. 

66 Jiji Shimpo, March 14, 1911. 


50 Democracy and Japanese Government 

not believe that universal suffrage will bring a result better than the 
present statutes. I believe the Bill has not been introduced from 
real necessity, but rather that it is based upon the principle of 
democracy. Therefore, hereafter I will see that such a bill does not 
even pass the gate of the House of Peers. 67 

In examining public opinion at the time when the suffrage 
bill was being discussed by the legislators, one may be sur¬ 
prised at the absence of any popular excitement. The writer, 
in examining many magazines as well as the press, could 
scarcely find any strong resentment expressed at the failure 
of the passage of the bill. The Osaka Asahi barely mentioned 
the announcement of the presentation of the bill before the 
Diet, while the Jiji was silent. Even when the bill passed the 
Lower House and was rejected by the Upper House both papers 
seemed entirely indifferent. They merely mentioned it in a 
casual way as a part of the proceedings of the legislature. 
No leading publication discussed the problem in its editorials. 
Four or five years had to pass before the people or the press 
really began to understand what the extension of suffrage 
means in the development of constitutional government. 

67 Parliamentary records in the House of Peers, March 15, 1911, in Jiji Shimpo, 
March 16, 1911. 


) 


Chapter IV 


DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT FOR THE EXTENSION 

OF THE SUFFRAGE 

During the world war a general movement for the extension 
of suffrage was slowly taking place. Thus, early in 1918 
electoral reform bills were introduced by each of the three 
leading parties. The features of these bills were the extension 
of the franchise by lowering the property qualification of the 
electors from ten yen of direct national taxes to five yen or 
from ten yen to two yen, 1 readjustment of electoral districts; 
bestowal of the right of suffrage to those who had certain 
educational qualifications. Besides these the government 
also laid before the house a bill which would increase the 
number of representatives from 381 to 438. The Seiyukai 
insisted upon the adoption of the principle of election by 
small districts while the Constitutional party (Kenseikai) 
and the People’s party (Kokuminto) tried to keep alive the 
then existing system of large electoral districts. In the bill 
granting the right of suffrage to those with certain educational 
standing, both the People’s and Constitutional parties sub¬ 
stantially agreed to give the vote to those who had the follow¬ 
ing educational qualification: (1) Graduates from high schools, 
normal schools, or from schools higher than these; (2) gradu¬ 
ates from those institutions where politics, economics, and 
finance are taught with permission from the Minister of 
Education. 2 

The problem of increasing the number of representatives 
was also considered by each party. The suggestion of the 
Seiyukai in this matter was to increase the number from 381 

1 Shin Horei, Taiyo, Zohan, May 20, 1919, p. 70—History of Imperial Diet. The 
Kokuminto differed from the Kenseikai and Seiyukai in that it insisted upon lowering 
the property qualification to three yen. 

2 Shin Horei. The Kenseikai differed from Kokuminto as to the educational quali¬ 
fication in that it provided, besides these educational qualifications, a clause reading: 
“Those graduated must be able to live independently.” 


« 


52 Democracy and Japanese Government 

to 444 3 while the Constitutional and People’s parties provided 
in their respective bills for increases to 439 and 461 respectively. 

In addition to these the Kenseikai or the Constitutional 
party also introduced a bill which provided, first, for shortening 
the residence requirement from one year to six months, and 
second, for giving the right of suffrage to those who can earn 
their own living. It was also noteworthy that for the first 
time the Kenseikai tried to lessen the influences of certain 
corporations over the government by proposing that “officers, 
directors, and managers of banks or corporations, with un¬ 
limited liability, enjoying special protection from or super¬ 
vision by the government and also those who undertake 
government work under contract, and officers, directors, and 
managers of juridical persons, with unlimited liability, under¬ 
taking principally government work under contract shall be 
ineligible for the House of Representatives.” 4 The same bill 
also aimed to clarify the meaning of an ambiguous statute 5 
as well as to define the eligibility of the legislators by a pro¬ 
vision which reads: “No officers, unless retired, except those 
designated by the Imperial Ordinance, shall be eligible.” 6 

Though the government and each political party introduced 
their own bills, these generally speaking were of two kinds. 
One was that of the Seiyukai, which had the smaller electoral 
divisions as its main feature. The other provided for larger 
electoral divisions with some minor changes which we have 
seen. Of this latter kind was the government bill. The gov¬ 
ernment had already introduced an amendment in the House 
of Peers which would increase considerably the number of 
members. 7 Therefore the government bill in the House of 

3 Shin Horei (New Laws), May, 1918. Additional Issue of Taiyo, p. 69. 

4 Mr. Oyama on attitude of each party on the question of extending suffrage, p. 103. 
April number Chno Koron. 

5 Article XIII which reads, “Those who undertake government work under contract 
or those who are officers or juridical persons undertaking principally government 
work under contract shall be ineligible.” 

6 See footnote 1. 

7 It will be increased by eight. New Law increases maximum number of Counts 
from 17 to 20, and number of Viscount Barons from 70 to 75. Shin Horei, May, 
1918, p. 2. 


Extension of Suffrage 53 

Representatives was a kind of balance to this increase of the 
members in the House of Peers. It was generally agreed that 
the government had already secured the approval of the Privy 
Council for the bill and 8 also the approval of the Upper House 
in exchange for increasing the number of Peers. Therefore, 
there was every indication that the government bill would 
have passed through both Houses even against the opposition 
of the Seiyukai. All parties 9 except the Seiyukai, were united 
in support of the government bill. The Seiyukai were alarmed 
over the situation and negotiated with the government to 
secure the withdrawal of the government's bill on condition 
that the party withdraw its bill also. The party threatened 
the government that in the event of the government’s insisting 
on pressing its bill before the Diet against the wish of the 
party, they would oppose every bill including the industrial 
‘‘Mobilization Bill." 10 The government was alarmed and 
decided to withdraw the suffrage bill. 

Commenting on this, the editor of the Chugai Shogyo said: 

That a party government, if realized, will be just as indifferent 
to the interests of the people as the super-party ministry, has been 
proved by the majority party’s interference with the passage of the 
suffrage bill. The government bill was rejected solely from con¬ 
siderations of selfish party interest. The Seiyukai preferred to 
sacrifice the interests of the people rather than have it pass to its 
own disadvantage. 11 If the Seiyukai dared to abuse its power even 
while it was not yet in control of the government through the 
regular channels, how much more inconsiderately will it act if 
allowed to form a ministry on the basis of its influence. A political 

8 Shin Horei, May, 1918, p. 69. 

9 Kokuminto, Kenseikai, Shinsekai and part of Seiwa Kurabu—200 in number. 

10 Osaka Asaki, March 21, 1918. 

11 All parties united to support the principles of “large electoral districts” advanced 
by the government against the Seiyukai who wanted the principle of “small electoral 
districts.” Therefore, if the government insisted on its passage, it would result in the 
defeat of the Seiyukai. The “small electoral districts” system was the principle for 
which the Seiyukai fought for years in the past but was unable to get it through the 
Upper House. Therefore the passage of the government bill was regarded as a great 
defeat to the party. Moreover, if once such a bill passed, the Seiyukai would be 
probably unable to amend it for years to come since the Upper House seldom changes 
any important measure like the Election Law. 


54 Democracy and Japanese Government 

party should represent the will of the people. A majority party is 
only worthy of controlling influence when it represents the interests 
of the majority. But the Seiyukai does not seem to be so broad. 
The party is concerned only with the usurpation of power. If its 
own interest or caprice is served, it is indifferent whether its policies 
work for the interest of the people or not. 

It is a debatable question whether in this country a government 
based on the influence of a majority party would be better than a 
super-party government. The latter is free from many abuses to 
which a party government will inevitably be exposed. Such abuses 
can be prevented only by the vigilance of the public and by a highly 
developed sense of responsibility on the part of the political party. 
Neither the public nor the political parties seem to possess such 
qualities. Herein lies the weakness of the party government, and 
the strength of the super-party government. As long as political 
parties have no sense of responsibility to the people and are un¬ 
worthy of their confidence, super-party government will be able to 
maintain its prestige. 12 

In the 1919 session of the Diet, the political parties as 
well as the government again proposed suffrage reform bills. 
The main features of these were similar to those of previous 
years. There were, however, marked differences, especially 
regarding the tax-paying qualification. The Kokuminto, the 
most liberal party, proposed a bill, first, granting the franchise 
to those who pay direct taxes to the extent of two yen per 
annum, instead of ten yen, and to those who are graduates of 
the high schools, normal schools, or those who have completed 
their military service; secondly, increasing the number of 
members of the House of Representatives in accordance with 
the population, one representative being allotted for every 
130,000 in the counties and one for every 30,000 persons in 
the cities; thirdly, establishing regulations to prevent gov¬ 
ernment interference in elections; and lastly, lowering the 
age qualification of the voter from twenty-five to twenty, and 
in case of candidates from thirty to twenty-five. 13 The Kensei- 
kai also introduced a suffrage reform bill which was similar 

12 The Chugai Shogyo, March 21, 1918. 

13 The Jiji, December 29, 1918. 


Extension of Suffrage 55 

to that of the Kokuminto except in regard to educational 
qualifications. As to the latter, the Kenseikai, while main¬ 
taining principles similar to the Kokuminto, restricted its 
provision by inserting a clause that "only those graduates 
from high school who are maintaining an independent living 
shall have the right of suffrage.” 14 Following the lead of the 
Kokuminto and Kenseikai, the government also proposed a suf¬ 
frage bill. The main difference between the government bill 
and those of the Opposition was that the former adopted the 
small electoral system, dividing the country into 373 districts 15 
while the latter maintained the principle of a large electoral 
system on the ground that the small electoral system was 
unsatisfactory in the matter of minority representation. 16 

That the trend of public opinion was undoubtedly toward 
democracy was revealed by public opinion itself as well as by 
the debates which took place in the Diet. There were many 
politicians as well as plain people who were dissatisfied with 
the proposed suffrage bills based on the property qualification. 
The students of Tokyo Imperial University, which hitherto 
has been regarded as a hotbed of bureaucracy, organized a 
movement supported by the radical members of the House 
to bring about manhood suffrage. They presented to the 
Emperor a petition which read: 

When the late Emperor Meiji established his Government at the 
beginning of his era, he wisely announced that the policy of the 
country should be decided by public opinion. Thus we, the subjects 
of your Majesty, were granted freedom and opportunity to respond 
to your Majesty’s benevolence by directly participating in the 
affairs of state. In spite of this fact, the politicians in the govern¬ 
ment have exerted themselves for the last thirty years to prevent us 
from obtaining full rights of participating in politics, which are to 
be duly granted to us, by establishing a law which regulates the 
qualification of franchise holders. Due to the great changes which 
have taken place in the political and social situation at home and 

14 Toyo Kezai Shinpo, No. 483, March 5, 1919. P* 38 . 

15 Tokyo, Asahi, February 27, 1919, p. 4 - 

16 Speech by Representative Saito in the House on Suffrage Reform, March 8, 
1919. Jiji, March 8, 1919. P- 2. 


56 Democracy and Japanese Government 

abroad the time has come when the country should adopt universal 
suffrage as the basis of the nation’s political activity. We, the 
members of the National Students’ League, hereby desire to express 
the thoughts of seventy millions of Your Majesty’s faithful sub¬ 
jects, while earnestly praying for the long reign of Your Majesty 
and the prosperity of our country. 17 

Mr. Ozaki, a radical member of the Kenseikai, was one of 
the strongest advocates of manhood suffrage. At a meeting 
on February 9, 1919, at Nagoya, he delivered the following 
speech on universal manhood suffrage: 

The late Emperor, soon after ascending the throne, issued,a 
message declaring that the administration of the country should be 
based on public opinion and that the principle of equality among all 
classes of the people should be observed. The Constitution was 
framed in this spirit and put into force. As a matter of practice, 
however, this principle is not strictly observed. According to the 
law of the House of Peers, Princes and Marquises occupy hereditary 
seats in the chamber without election. In the Upper House there is 
another class of members who are elected from the big tax-payers. 
The state, however, does not exist by reason of the high tax-payers 
alone, and there are a large number of men in different walks of life 
who are as much entitled to seats in the House on account of their 
contribution to the state in various respects as are all these big tax¬ 
payers. Moreover, the property of those big tax payers is created 
only by the co-operation of the poorer class. For instance, the 
wealth of the land is really created by the tenants who cultivate 
and produce it. No landlord can cultivate vast areas of land by 
himself. Therefore, in a sense, the tenants themselves are directly 
paying the tax. The present prevailing practices are contrary to 
the principles of equality and must be interpreted as recognizing a 
difference in political rights between the poor and the rich. Similar 
instances of class distinction may be given. Students known for 
their superiority in the colleges and schools have to bow before the 
sons of the rich, once they are out in active life, no matter how able 
they are or how talented. No wonder that the dissatisfaction 
engendered by such inequality should find vent on such occasions 
as the rice-riots of last year. 


17 Japanese Advertiser, February io, 1919, p. 10. 


Extension of Suffrage 57 

Nothing could be more advisable or effective than the adoption 
of universal suffrage for the realization of equality among all the 
classes. Different views are advocated as to the lowering of the 
property qualifications of voters, but it is quite absurd to wrangle 
over the matter. Suppose the qualification of voters be lowered to 
payment of a two yen tax, then the number of voters to be obtained 
by this process will be only 4,000,000 out of a population of 60,- 
000,000, and the extent to which the prevailing discontent regarding 
the unequal distribution of the suffrage would thus be removed 
must be considered infinitesimal. 

At present laborers are entirely excluded from taking part in 
politics. This omission must be rectified. An essential condition 
of the administration of a country should be the safety and security 
of living among all classes, but under the present condition there is 
neither safety nor security of living among such classes as school 
teachers and minor officials. Under such circumstances it is not 
surprising that there should take place an irresistible movement 
for the removal of the existing bars of inequality. 

Nothing is more dangerous than the worship of bureaucratic 
ideas, which have brought ruin to Russia and Germany. Some 
years ago an argument was advanced in the House of Peers that 
it would be dangerous to allow universal suffrage, and that it was 
absolutely necessary that some property qualification be adopted. 
In other words, the advocates of this theory imply that all the 
Japanese who do not pay Kny direct tax are not intelligent enough to 
vote or are even dangerous. It should be remembered, however, 
that the same people who are not intelligent or who are even danger¬ 
ous are recruited as conscripts for the defense of the country. This 
is the height of absurdity and partiality. For these reasons it is 
only just and right that the existing unequal distribution of political 
rights be abolished and universal suffrage be adopted. 18 

The Miyako entertained the same opinion as Mr. Ozaki 
and it attacked vigorously in its editorials the proposed suffrage 
bills based on the property qualification. It said: 

The present franchise system is inadequate in that only a limited 
number of men have the privilege of voting. In Japan there are 
only 1,500,000 electors. The comparison of the number of the 

18 Speech of Representative Ozaki on universal suffrage, February 9, at Nagoya, 
as quoted in Japan Advertiser , February 11, 1919, P- I0 - 


58 Democracy and Japanese Government 

electorate in our country with that in England indicates that we 
men are not given a right equal to one-fourth of that of the British 
women to participate in the nation’s council. We now possess an 
army as large as that of Great Britain. The government encourages 
the men to serve the country regardless of their property qualifica¬ 
tions, saying that to become a soldier of the Emperor is the noblest 
duty of a Japanese. That is all right, but why are the majority of 
our countrymen not allowed to take part in national politics? In a 
word, the authorities recognize the full value of a Japanese man as a 
soldier, but in their eyes his value as a voter is hardly as much as 
one-fourth that of a British woman. 19 

These extracts which could be multiplied by thousands 
taken from resolutions, speeches, and writings, clearly indi¬ 
cate the trend towards democracy in Japan at present. In 
1911 when the universal suffrage bill which passed the Lower 
House was rejected in the Upper House, one could hardly find 
any popular argument or press comment; but the political 
atmosphere of 1919 was entirely different. 

On February 26 the Cabinet introduced a suffrage bill in 
the House. Mr. Tokonami, Minister of Interior, delivered a 
speech stating the reason for introducing the bill. He said: 

More than eighteen years have elapsed since the present election 
law was put into force, but it has not succeeded in bringing about 
the purpose for which it was designed. A reform of the law in 
keeping with the requirements of the period has long been recog¬ 
nized as necessary, though so far the government has not been able 
to put the required revision into concrete shape. According to the 
existing law the number of voters is 1,440,000, which represents 2.6 
per cent, of the total population. The percentage is too small to 
form the basis of a real representative system of government. The 
Government, however, is of the opinion that too radical a change 
is not advisable, and so it will adhere to a policy of gradually extend¬ 
ing the suffrage. 

With regard to fixing the qualifications of voters, various theories 
have been advanced; but the Government is convinced that it 
would be most advisable, in view of the prevailing condition in the 

19 The Tokyo Miyako as quoted in the Woman Citizen, Vol. Ill, No. 36, February, 

1919. 


Extension of Suffrage 59 

country, for the property qualification to be fixed at an annual 
payment of a three yen tax. In case the qualification is lowered to 
three yen as proposed, the number of voters will be increased from 
1,460,000 to 2,860,000—nearly double the present number. It has 
been claimed by some that “the intellectual class” should be included 
among the voters. The demand, though it may appear reasonable 
at a first glance, will be found untenable on closer scrutiny. It is 
contended by the advocates of this theory that all graduates of high 
schools and higher colleges should be given the franchise. It should 
be observed, however, that besides the school graduates there are 
many men who are as intelligent and educated as these graduates. 
Consequently it would be difficult to make education a basis of 
suffrage qualification, and, if adopted, it could hardly be considered 
fair and impartial. 

The existing system of the large electorate was adopted with the 
hope of eliminating bribery and other questionable methods which 
w'ere made easier on account of the small electorate. The experience 
of the last ten years has demonstrated beyond all doubt that, with 
the large electorate, corruption is made easier than in the old .small 
electorate and therefore the Government, taught by experience, has 
mapped out a system of small electorates which will be most suitable 
to the condition of the country. 

In the bill before the House the Government has allotted the 
number of representatives roughly at the rate of a representative 
for 130,000 people. The result will be that the total number of Diet 
members will be increased to 464 showing an increase of eighty- 
three over the present number. In other words, the number of 
members for the urban districts will be increased from 75 to 112 and 
that of members for the country districts from 305 to 352. 20 

As to the change in the electoral district, the government 
vigorously insisted upon the small district system. Mr. 
Tokonami, Minister of the Interior, gave the following reasons 
for this: (1) Decrease of the election expense; (2) elimination of 
election contests among party members in the district; (3) de¬ 
velopment of the political ideas of the district; (4) more justice 
in the results of elections; (5) elimination of the trouble of by- 

20 Speech of Minister of Interior in the House, February 25, Tokyo Asahi, February 
26, 1919, p. 2. Translation in Japanese Advertiser, February 26, 1919. P- 



6 o 


Democracy and Japanese Government 

elections in whole prefecture; (6) stricter enforcement of elec¬ 
tion laws; etc. 21 

The Opposition vigorously opposed the change. “The Gov¬ 
ernment bill for small electoral districts,” says Hon. Uyehara, 
“will greatly increase the practice of selling and buying votes. 
It is possible neither to have a fair election nor to elect ideal 
candidates.” 22 During the first six elections under the small 
district system, candidates were elected on the average by 
sixty-five per cent, of the total votes cast, while in the seventh 
to the thirteenth elections under the large district system 
candidates were elected on the average by seventy-nine per 
cent, of the total votes. Even so, under the small electoral 
district system the number of votes received by those defeated 
in the election often exceeds the votes received by those 
elected, especially when there are three candidates in a district. 
For instance, in the twelfth general election, the total number 
of votes the candidates-elect received in six independent 
districts, Tsushima, Takasaki, Hirosaki, Ogi, Tokushima, and 
Oshima, was 1,927, whereas the total number of votes received 
by those defeated was 2,693, that is, men were elected in those 
districts by forty-two per cent.; “therefore the small electoral 
system is by no means an ideal system.” 23 As has been shown 
elsewhere, the chief defect of the small electoral system is the 
impossibility of furnishing a fair representation to the minori¬ 
ties. It also tends to create too much sectionalism which 
makes it impossible for any independent candidate to run 
successfully against the party machine. 

After spirited debates which lasted for almost two weeks, 
the Government bill passed the Lower House with a majority 
of 61 out of 349 votes cast. The same bill also passed the 
Upper House with a majority of 204 out of 228 votes cast. 24 

The main features of the new revised law are: 

21 Minister Tokonami, Speech on Suffrage Reform.—The Tokyo Asahi, p. 2, Febru¬ 
ary 26, 1919. 

22 Dr. Uyehara, on Suffrage Reform. Ibid, February 27. 

23 Mr. Saito, Problem of increasing the electorate and electoral district. Taiyo, 
February first issue, pp. 115-116. 

24 Shin Horei Taiyo Zokan, p. 94. May 20, 1919. 


Extension of Suffrage 61 

1. Small electoral districts with the principle of single 
member constituencies. 25 

2. Reduction of the property qualifications from ten yen 
of direct national taxation to three yen annually. 

3. Redistribution of seats and an increase of 83 in member¬ 
ship of the House of Representatives, i. e., from 381 to 464. 26 

This latest law increases the number of voters by 1,400,000. 
It, however, still excludes a large number of the small agri¬ 
cultural and landholding classes. Moreover, as the revised 
law is still based on the principle that the property holding 
class should have a special privilege, it excludes a large number 
of the intelligent class. The following will serve to give a gen¬ 
eral idea of Japanese democracy in respect to suffrage: 



In Cities 

In Counties 

Total 

Number of voters with college education 

under the law of 1900 27 . 

Number of voters with college education 

36,000 

70,000 

106,000 

under revised law 28 . 

Number of voters with high school or simi- 

48,000 

95,000 

143,000 

lar educational standing under the re¬ 
vised law 29 . 



150,000 

Total number of voters regardless of edu- 




cation under the law of 1900 in March, 
1919 . 



1,460,000 

Total number in the next election . . . 



2,859,000 


25 In counties the districts were roughly divided, making one representative for 
each 130,000; however, there are five districts which elect one representative for 
about 190,000 population, while there are also twelve districts which elect one repre¬ 
sentative for 90,000. Speech of Minister of Interior, February 25, on the floor of the 
Diet. Larger cities, as in counties, elect one representative for every 130,000. Senkyo 
HO Kaisei Yomoku —Nichi Nichi, p. 2, February 25, 1919. Smaller cities elect one 
representative for every 30,000. 

26 Tokyo Nichi Nichi, February 23, 1919, p. 3. Under the law of 1900, cities were 
represented by 76 against 305 in counties; under the revised law of 1919, cities will 
be represented by 112 and counties by 352. There will be ^78 electoral districts; 
single-member districts, 298; two-member districts, 69; three-member districts, 11. 

27 Tokonami, Minister of Interior (Kikairoku).—The Kokumin Shinbun, March 
12, 1919. 

28 Tokonami.—Tokyo Nichi Nichi, February 26, 1919. P- 2. 

29 There are about 180,000 high school graduates alone who are excluded, solely 
because they are not tax-payers of 3 yen a year. It is said that among 180,000 there 
are only 40,000 or so who can have an independent living. Representative Saito— 
Shiugien Kaiseiho, Nichi Nichi, p. 2, February 26, 1919* 






62 


Democracy and Japanese Government 

Considering the fact that only the small landholding class 
enjoys the reform, the revised law failed entirely to satisfy 
the majority of the liberals. 

Scarcely a year has passed since another movement for the 
extension of suffrage has taken place in Japan. Even such an 
ultra-conservative paper as the Kokumin began to declare itself 
for universal suffrage as follows: 

What is welcome to the disaffected classes in Europe and America 
is not Christ’s, but Lenine’s gospel. This is an age of destruction. 
We urge universal suffrage as a means of limiting to a minimum the 
evil effect on the country of this general tendency of the world and 
as a safety-valve for dangerous ideas. Besides, no one can deny 
that a great many difficulties lie in the path of the Empire, and it is 
as certain as the sun will rise to-morrow morning that a great 
capitalistic force will bring pressure to bear on the Empire sooner or 
later, in some form or other; and this danger can only be faced by 
a general mobilization of the nation. Now, in order to make an 
effective physical mobilization of the nation in case of emergency, 
it is necessary that the latter should be placed in a state of moral 
mobilization in ordinary times—in other words, it is necessary that 
the nation should be allowed to participate in the government and 
made fully interested in, and conversant with, the administrative 
and diplomatic policies of the Empire. In short, we urge universal 
suffrage as a preparation for a general mobilization of the nation on 
the one hand and a safety-valve for dangerous thought on the other, 
and also for a political education and training of the nation, for one 
can learn how to swim only in water. 30 

The Tokyo Nichi-nichi , an organ of the middle class, also 
favoring the adoption of universal suffrage, remarks: 

In days when the nation at large was backward in political 
knowledge, it was perhaps desirable for a smooth working of the 
legislative organ that privileged and propertied classes alone should 
have a share in the Government; when political intelligence is 
diffused in all sections of the nation, as it now is, the legislative 
organ, in the operations of which all the nation are deeply interested, 
should be common property of all. So not only should the tax 
qualification be abolished, but all males of twenty-five years and 

30 Quoted in Literary Digest, February 28, 1920. 


Extension of Suffrage 63 

upwards, making their independent livelihood, should be admitted 
to the franchise . . . It is evident that even the Government 

and its party are alive to the necessity of adopting universal suffrage, 
although they hesitate to do so on consideration of party tactics. 31 

These editorials are only a few extracts from among many 
resolutions and writings appearing in magazines and papers. 

The main features of the universal manhood suffrage bills 
are as follows: 

Kenseikai Kokuminto 


Tax qualification. None None 

Other qualification.Those who can live 

independently 

Age qualification for both electors and 

candidates 32 . 25 20 

Election district.Chu-senkyo-ku 33 Small district 


Besides these, the Kokuminto proposed a bill allowing all 
students above twenty years of age to vote, for the present 
total excluded, and also giving the franchise to the primary 
school teachers as well as to priests. 

On February 26, 1920, a great debate took place in the Diet 
on the question of suffrage. The Government opposed this 
new bill on the ground that the election law passed in 1919 
should be put to test before conferring universal suffrage upon 
all males in Japan. But the fact was, as revealed in Premier 
Hara’s speech later, that the government was not anxious to 
participate in a democratic movement. In a speech before 
his own party, Premier Hara said: “Universal suffrage will 
bring a destruction of social class distinctions and is a menace 
to the conscription system.” 34 The Government had found 
that both Kokuminto and Kenseikai united for the passage 
of this bill. Therefore, without awaiting a test vote which 
might have amounted to an expression of a lack of confidence 
in the Cabinet, the Government has ordered the dissolution 

31 Ibid. 

32 Tokyo Asahi, January 21, 1920, p. 3. The Kenseikai also proposed in the bill 
to increase the number of representatives from 462 to 485. 

33 District between Scrutin de liste and Scrutin d’arrondissement in size. 

34 Premier Hara, March 17, 1920. 






64 Democracy and Japanese Government 

of the Diet by Imperial decree. This is the first dissolution 
of the Diet on the question of suffrage in our political history. 
Hitherto the majority of dissolutions have resulted from an 
exercise of the Diet’s right of address to the Emperor showing 
a want of confidence in the government. 

A general election was held on May io, 1920. The result, 
as predicted, was a land-slide victory for the Government. It 
secured over sixty per cent, of the members in the newly 
elected House of Representatives. One of the most striking 
characteristics of this election was that the Government party 
(Seiyukai) lost heavily in the urban districts while the Opposi¬ 
tion lost in the country districts. This indicates that the 
extension of suffrage is favored by the urban voters while the 
conservative voters in the country are against it. 


Chapter V 


DEMOCRACY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 

It is interesting to note that the Japanese method of pro¬ 
viding for local participation in the work of administration is 
quite different from the American method, in that local gov¬ 
ernment is conducted by officers who are agents of the central 
government, and who are at the same time executives of local 
administration. In this system local power is given by the 
Diet by general grant, but exercise of it is subject to central 
administrative control. The Diet has never attempted to 
enumerate the duties of the local corporations with the same 
minuteness as in America. The laws simply enumerate the 
principles of local administration, leaving the localities to 
carry them out in detail. The local corporations are not, 
therefore, as in America, given specific powers, but have the 
right to exercise all such powers as they wish provided they 
do not violate the letter or the spirit of the law. However, 
they are subject to a rigid central administrative control 
which prevents them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction 
of the central government and from acting extravagantly or 
unwisely. 

Throughout Japanese local government the principle of 
separation of matters of general and of local administration is 
sharply drawn. Such subjects as police, schools, and the 
supervision of subordinate local authorities are deemed to 
affect the whole country, and are placed in the hands of per¬ 
sons who act as agents of the national government; while the 
construction of roads, the establishment of market houses, the 
maintenance of almshouses, and the voting of appropriations 
for local purposes are regarded as matters of local interest. 

Another feature of Japanese local government is the dis¬ 
tinction between professional and lay (honorary) officials. It 


66 Democracy and Japanese Government 

is said that the introduction of unpaid or lay officers into local 
government lessens the influence of the bureaucracy in local 
affairs and tends to draft into the public service the better 
class of private citizens and at the same time to interest the 
people in local self-government. All professional officials are 
members of the Japanese bureaucracy. Before they are 
qualified to hold positions, they are required to go through an 
elaborate training, and to pass a civil examination. The non¬ 
professional officers have no special training, but are selected 
from among the members of the assembly. 

Japan proper is divided for the purpose of local administra¬ 
tion into forty-three prefectures and three Fus, excluding 
Hokkaido, Taiwan and Chosen. These are sub-divided into 
sub-districts or counties in which urban and rural communes 
are organized. Rural communes are the smallest local entities; 
they differ somewhat in area and population. Urban com¬ 
munes are of two classes. One is called the city and is an inde¬ 
pendent municipal county; the other is the urban commune 
called Cho or Machi. The organization of government within 
these divisions is practically uniform and is characterized by 
the vesting of executive power in a single officer, called governor 
or prefect in the Fu or prefecture, Guncho in the counties, and 
mayor or headman in the communes. The administrative 
relation of these divisions is highly hierarchical. Appeals go 
from each local government to the next above it. The whole 
system of Japanese local administration is quite similar to the 
Prussian and French hierarchical administration of local 
government. 

Like the national election laws, the prefectural election laws 
(Fu-ken-sei) place restrictions in the way of property quali¬ 
fications both upon the electorate and candidates. The princi¬ 
ple laid down in the law is that only those who show sufficient 
evidence of attachment to the community are entitled to 
suffrage. This evidence must be in the tangible form of the 
possession of a certain amount of property. Article VI, which 
prescribes the qualifications of an elector, provides that "for 


Local Government 


6 7 

not less than one year previous to the date of the making out 
of the electoral list, he must have been paying a national direct 
tax of three yen or more, and must be still paying the same.” 
The results of this provision were that the voting constituency 
was limited to 2,384,078 1 in all prefects, fus, and Hokkaido. 
As the population of Japan at present is about fifty-five millions, 
this means about one voter to every twenty-three persons. 

The same characteristics are evidenced in the requirement 
of property qualifications for the legislative candidates. The 
law reads: “Those inhabitants of the communes alone shall be 
eligible, who are male Japanese of not less than fully twenty- 
five years of age and who, in the Fu or Ken, in which they 
desire to be elected, have been paying direct national taxes to 
an amount not less than ten yen, one year previous to the 
date of the making out of the electoral list, and who are still 
paying the amount of direct national taxes.” 2 Consequently 
the law disqualifies many men of ability and intelligence fit to 
serve their prefects as members of the Assembly. As the 
Assembly is an honorary office, its members are not compen¬ 
sated for their service. 

The system which eliminates the greater part of the intelli¬ 
gent class from exercising political rights, coupled with the 
helplessness of their representatives, is largely responsible for 
the extensive apathy of the voters in prefectures in Japan. 
In 1915 there were 2,384,078 s voters, of whom those who 
actually exercised their political rights were only 1,924,068. 4 
Out of that number the valid votes amounted to only 1,896,210. 
There were 460,027 5 absentees, that is, more than one-fifth 
did not take a part in the election at all. 

The prefectural governmental organs consist of an executive 
and two deliberative bodies—council and assembly. The 
members of the assembly are elected for a term of four years. 

1 The Teikoku, No. 36, Tokei Nenkwan, p. 647, 1918. 

2 Fu-Ken Sei, Article VI. 

3 The Teikoku Tokei Nenkwan, No. 36, p. 647, 1918. 

' *Ibid. 

3 Ibid. 



68 Democracy and Japanese Government 

The size of the assembly varies according to population. The 
minimum number required is at least thirty in those prefectures 
which have a population of less than 700,000. The matters 
that are to be deliberated and decided by the assembly are 
principally the following: The determining of the budget; 
the making of reports on financial estimates and settled 
accounts (Kessan Hokoku ni kwansuru koto); the determin¬ 
ing of the mode of imposing and of collecting duties for use 
(shiyoryo), fees, prefectural taxes, and services in person or in 
kind, so far as not determined by laws or Imperial ordinances; 
alienation, purchase, exchange, or mortgage of the immovable 
property of the prefecture of Fu; and the determining of the 
modes of management of the prefectural property and estab¬ 
lishment. 6 

The prefectural law also empowers the assembly to deliberate 
and decide anything within its legal jurisdiction. This vague 
and comprehensive authority is accompanied by a careful 
supervision and control on the part of the government; hence 
the governor or prefect, as the agent of the national govern¬ 
ment, has an extensive supervisory power. In all matters, 
whether it be the budget or ordinary legislation, the function 
of the assembly is merely deliberative. Its resolutions can be 
carried out only after they have been approved by the governor 
who has power to veto subject to confirmation by the central 
government. Even as to appropriations, the power of the 
assembly is not great. The assembly can not refuse any 
appropriation necessary for the execution of any laws already 
enacted. If the appropriations are not made by the assembly, 
the governor with the advice of the Minister of the Interior, 
may include the necessary amount of such expenditures in 
the budget in order to carry out laws or Imperial ordinances 
already upon the statute books. The law provides: 

In case the prefectural assembly has not taken up necessary bills 
or has failed to conclude its deliberations thereon within the period 
of meeting, the governor with the consent of the Minister of Interior 


* Fu-Ken Sei, Article XLI. 


Local Government 69 

may determine the amount of the local expenditures and the means 
of defraying them and execute his plan. T 

The sessions of the assembly are brief. It meets regularly 
once a year, but its duration is limited to a month, and although 
extra sessions can be held for a week at a time, discussion in 
such sessions is confined to the special subject upon which the 
session has been called. 8 

The functions of the council, like those of the assembly, 
are largely deliberative. The council formerly was the stand¬ 
ing committee of the assembly. The Imperial Decree No. 49, 
issued November 5, 1880, reads: 

The Standing Committee shall be consulted by, and give advice 
to, the Governor in accordance with the resolutions of the Assembly, 
upon the works which are to be paid for out of the local taxes. In 
case of urgent necessity, the Standing Committee may decide the 
amount to be spent upon such works, and report the same to the 
Assembly later. The Committee shall also receive bills to be intro¬ 
duced by the Governor into Assembly, and shall give its opinion. 

These Standing Committees have been gradually trans¬ 
formed into a council which since 1899, has exercised advisory 
powers in the local administration. 

At present the council is composed of a governor, two high 
officials, and non-professional members who are elected for a 
year by the assembly from among its members. The func¬ 
tions of the council as enumerated in the Fu-Ken Sei under the 
revised laws of Meiji 32 are as follows: 

(1) To deliberate and decide those questions which are 
entrusted to it by the assembly, provided such questions are 
within the legal jurisdiction of the assembly; (2) to deliberate 
and decide, on behalf of the assembly, any question which 
requires urgent attention when the governor has no time to 
call a special session of the assembly; (3) to express its opinion 
on the bills to be introduced by the governor into the assembly; 
(4) to deliberate and decide upon the management of public 
property in conformity with the resolution of the assembly; 

7 Article LXXXII-LXXXV. 

8 Fu-Ken Sei, Article L. 


70 


Democracy and Japanese Government 


(5) to determine the regulations in reference to the carrying out 
of public works to be paid for out of prefectural funds, provided 
such regulations are not still made by the laws, etc. 

Besides these functions the council performs within certain 
limits judicial functions, such as the settling of claims against 
the prefecture and the decision of disputes between communes. 

The meetings of the council are secret, and they are held 
more frequently than those of the assembly. The prefect 
can call the council at any time; upon the demand of the 
honorary members of the council, he must do so if such demand 
is reasonable. The attendance of the chairman (governor) 
or his representatives and at least one-half of the honorary 
members of the council is required for the validity of any 
meeting. 9 

The supreme authority is placed in the chairman of the 
council, namely, the governor. Just as the council may refuse 
to amplify the resolutions passed by the assembly when it 
believes them to be illegal or improper, so may the governor 
control the action of the council. If any decision of the council 
appears to exceed its jurisdiction, or is prejudicial to public 
good, the governor may, upon his own judgment, or by in¬ 
struction of the Minister of Interior, suspend its execution. 10 
If the council is not satisfied with the decision of the governor, 
the case may be taken into the administrative court. 11 In case 
of an emergency the governor can settle any question without 
the council upon his own judgment, making report of his 
decision at the next meeting. 12 

The governor is central figure in Japanese local administra¬ 
tion. He is appointed by the Emperor by the advice of the 
Minister of Interior, and holds office during his pleasure. 13 
He is the chief agent of the national government, and under 
the direct control of the Minister of Interior in all ordinary 

» Fu-Ken Sei, Article LXXIII. 

Article LXXXII. 

11 Ibid. 

12 Article LXXXV. 

13 The governor is appointed by the Minister of Interior in practice. 


Local Government 


7 1 


matters; but in finance he is responsible to the Minister of 
Finance. He is both a central and a local officer. As a central 
officer he is to see that all laws, ordinances and instructions 
sent out by the ministers are put into operation. 14 

It is significant that as an agent of the general government 
the governor fulfills a legal role as electioneering agent of the 
government, and it is his activity in this respect that has 
become one of the chief sources of his unpopularity. It is 
frequently said that the first requisite of a good governor is 
that he should make a good electioneering agent in carrying 
the prefecture for government candidates. When a political 
combat between the government forces and the Opposition 
becomes acute, the government is said to instruct secretly 
either the governor or the police commissioner to use his 
influence in favor of government candidates. In 1916 Police 
Commissioner Niki resigned his position because he was 
dissatisfied with the interference of Baron Goto, then Minister 
of Interior, who instructed him to suppress the candidates of 
the Opposition. He announced his reasons as follows: 

The circumstance which caused my resignation was not due to 
the fact that the present cabinet is a super-party government 
opposing the interest of the people, but it was due to the fact that a 
man like Goto with such a responsible position as Minister of 
Interior interferes unjustly with elections under the pretense of law 
and order. How culpable it is to have such interference from Goto 
who publicly instructs his subordinates to do justice and contempt¬ 
ibly and secretly instructed me to persuade a certain person to 
become a candidate against the Opposition candidates. When Mr. 
Tatsubana, with instructions from Goto, tried in vain to induce his 
father to become a candidate, he persuaded Mr. Inugari through his 
relatives, who declared publicly that Mr. Inugari’s candidacy would 
be backed by the governor. When this was unsuccessful they 
blamed the governor and the injustice of the police commissioner 
(me). I can not stand for instructions which usurp the police power 
so long as I am head of the police in the prefecture. The govern¬ 
ment knows well that I am legally forbidden to take part in politics. 


“ Article LXXVIII. 


72 


Democracy and Japanese Government 

To ask me to use my influence to make some person a candidate 
against the Opposition is clearly against the spirit of the law. 15 

The prefect has the power to appoint and to dismiss a large 
number of officers employed in the administrative services of 
the local government (including even the school teachers), 
subject in some cases to the approval of the Minister of Interior. 
The prefect also has power to issue either for the whole terri¬ 
tory under his control or for a part of it, city or prefectural 
ordinances relating to administrative and police business. 
These ordinances and police powers give the prefects a large 
opportunity for interfering in local affairs, and this is a constant 
source of complaint. As head of the police offices, he can 
direct all police officers and determine the distribution, separa¬ 
tion, and uniting of branch police offices in each urban and 
rural division. 16 He even has the power to call the militia in 
any case of extraordinary emergency. 

Although the power of the governor is so extensive, there is 
a growing tendency for the governor to work in conjunction 
with the representatives of the people. 17 He is realizing that 
without co-operation with other members of the council he 
can not successfully govern the prefecture, especially as he is 
often a stranger in the state where he is stationed. Further¬ 
more, his tenure of office is very uncertain. He is subject to 
transfer from one place to another. This phenomenon becomes 
more striking and more frequent with the growing of party 
influence. If the governor acts contrary to the interests of the 
assembly or non-professional members of the council who not 
only are representatives of the people, but also are affiliated 
with a party, the people or their representative can take up 
the matter directly or indirectly before the Minister of Interior, 

n Shinbun Nenkwan, June, 1917, p. 139. 

16 Rules for Police Administration, Article II. Meiji 8 (March 7), Taisei Kwan 
Tatsu, No. 29. See also Shiho Keisatsu Rei, Article III. 

17 The proof of this tendency is that the governor usually listens to the popular 
wishes in removing local officers or teachers. The growing tendency towards local self- 
government is making the governor feel more responsible to the people of the prefecture. 
Though appointed by the Minister of Interior, he frequently owes his appointment to 
the favorable influence of the representatives from his prefecture. 


Local Government 


73 


who is ever anxious to win the favor of the people, because his 
opposition to the interests of the people will result in the 
defeat of his party, assuming he is a member of some political 
party. Even if he is not a party man, the government will 
gain nothing by retaining a governor who is unpopular among 
the people of a prefecture. The government knows it is essen¬ 
tial to avoid any unnecessary conflict with the people in order 
that its bills may have a smooth path in the national Diet, 
since every member of the council or assembly 18 is directly 
affiliated with the national political parties. 

However, it is interesting to note from the following inci¬ 
dent how the governor can exercise his enormous power 
arbitrarily. 

In 1882 Governor Mishima was transferred to Fukushima- 
Ken, and it was rumored he had been sent to suppress the 
liberal parties in that province. It was reported that he had 
said: “As long as I am the governor, I shall see that thieves and 
the liberal parties shall not raise their heads.” Immediately 
upon assuming his duties in Fukushima-Ken, he dismissed 
ninety officers in the prefecture and substituted for them 
persons who were politically acceptable to him. He planned to 
construct two highways connecting his prefecture with Niugata 
and Yamagata. Without asking any appropriation or making 
any survey, he forced the people to pay 370,000 yen for the 
purpose. He ordered the people of six sub-prefectures, who 
were between fifteen and sixty, regardless of their wealth or 
poverty, to work one day in every month for two years. He 
charged those who could not work fifteen cents a day in case 
of men, and ten cents a day in case of women. He ordered the 
dissolution of the assembly of the towns and villages which 
opposed his plan. 

In connection with the prefectural government the Assembly 
of the Prefectural Governors should be considered. The first 

18 In 1915 the party affiliations of the 3 Fus and 40 prefectural assemblies were as 
follows: Seiyukai 641; Doshikai 566; Chusei kai 55; Kokuminto 108; no party 
affiliation 271. See Kokumin Nenkwan, 1916, p. 124. 


74 Democracy and Japanese Government 

session of the assembly was convened in 1875. The purpose 
of the convention was to apprise the central government of 
the condition of local affairs, to provide the facilities for the 
exchange of views in matters of local administration, and to 
discuss the bills submitted by the national government. It 
was said that the government in establishing this institution 
was to form some sort of foundation preparatory to the adop¬ 
tion of representative government. The reason of the govern¬ 
ment in summoning the governors was clearly stated in the 
imperial decree issued at the time, which read: 

In accordance with the meaning of the oath taken by Me at the 
commencement of My reign and as a gradual development of its 
policy, I am convening an assembly of representatives of the whole 
nation so as by the help of public discussion to ordain laws, thus 
opening up the way of harmony between governors and governed 
and of the accomplishment of national desires, and I trust by ensur¬ 
ing to each subject throughout the nation an opportunity of peace¬ 
fully pursuing his vocation to awaken thus a sense of the importance 
of matters of state. 

I have therefore issued this constitution of the deliberative 
assembly providing for the convening of the chief officials of the 
different local jurisdictions and for their meeting and deliberating 
as the representatives of the people. 19 

Mr. Kido, president of the Assembly, submitted for its 
consideration the question of a popular legislative assembly, 
though the majority of representatives maintained that the 
condition of the country was not right for such an advanced 
step. Thus we can see that the establishment of this institu¬ 
tion was intended to serve as a preliminary to the Constitution. 
However, the assembly of the Prefectural Governors has 
changed its nature in recent years. Instead of fostering the 
development of constitutional government it tends to retard it. 

According to the plan of its establishment it had the power 
to end its existence when the Diet [national legislative body], 
was established. The purpose of establishing the Assembly 

** Imperial Declaration, No. 58, May 2, 1874. Translation in English is quoted in 
Professor McLaren’s Japanese Government Documents, p. 505. 


Local Government 


75 


was to make the local authorities deliberate on the national 
administrative policy prior to the organization of the national 
Diet. The Assembly no longer fulfills the object for which it 
had been established. It is today convened as one means of 
extending the influence of bureaucracy. It does not increase 
the power of the people in local government. Once in every 
year at present the assembly is convened, usually right after 
the adjournment of the Diet, for the purpose of instructing 
the governors on the policy of the nation or of consulting with 
them on local conditions. 


Chapter VI 


DEMOCRACY AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 

9 

Our scheme of municipal government, like the rest of the 
Japanese system, originally came from Germany. It was 
drafted by a German scholar under the guidance of Prince I to, 
who was largely responsible for drafting the present Japanese 
constitution. A municipal law was promulgated together with 
statutes for the organization of towns and villages, April 14, 
1888, to go into effect a year later. Although the present 
municipal law is based on the revised laws of 1911, the prin¬ 
ciple as well as the spirit of its administration has not been 
changed. 

The preface to the decree of promulgation of the communal 
law is as follows: 

Animated by a desire for the development of the advantages 
attending the communal union of the country and for the promotion 
of the welfare of our subjects in general, and recognizing the im¬ 
portance of maintaining and of further extending the old customs 
of inter-relationship between neighbors, and of protecting the 
inherent rights of cities, towns, and villages by a new law, we give 
our sanction to the present law on the organization of cities and to 
that on the organization of towns and villages, and render it to be 
duly promulgated . 1 

Japanese political writers complain that many matters of 
purely local interest are administered and controlled by a 
minister at Tokyo who from his office may touch a button and 
give orders to 43 prefectures, 3 Fu, 636 sub-prefectures, 74 
cities, 12,218 towns and villages. 2 Perhaps there is not a com¬ 
munity in Japan today, however remote, in which the govern¬ 
ment at Tokyo does not have an agent to whom it can give 


1 Clement, p. 294, Political Science Quarterly, June, 1892. 

2 Kohumin Nenkwan, 1919, p. 143. 


Municipal Government 


77 


orders. The government is in close touch with local problems 
through the prefectural governor and the guncho, the head of 
the sub-prefectures. 

The administration of the communal government is highly 
centralized, and to a large extent the principle of centralization 
prevails in respect to legislation of a local character. It is said 
by the government that this supervision or control is necessary 
for the protection of tax-payers against the extravagance and 
wastefulness of municipal councils, as well as of citizens against 
possible arbitrary conduct of mayors and councils, who, 
through their rather broad powers, might violate the rights of 
individuals. It is argued that the powers of the communal 
authorities over finance must be kept in check by means of 
some form of central control in order to prevent the dissipation 
of communal property and resources and to forestall any 
inexpedient heavy loans which might oppress property owners 
because of resultant burdensome taxes. 

It is said that such powers of supervision and control as are 
exercised by the central executive over local authorities in 
Japan, as in Prussia, is justified solely on the theory that all 
local government is a devolution of State function and author¬ 
ity. The State has renounced certain powers, but subject to 
the condition that it may still retain the power to satisfy itself 
that these powers are properly exercised by the authorities to 
which they have been transferred. How rigid is the State in 
supervising the enforcement of its law can be seen from the 
fact that in 1915 Mayor Okuda of Tokyo received a disciplinary 
punishment from the governor of the Tokyo prefecture for his 
inefficient management of primary schools in the city. This 
disciplinary punishment seems to be unreasonable when we 
consider that the mayor in Japanese cities has no appointive 
power over the teachers in public schools. 3 The State imposes 
upon the local authorities the duty of discharging the state 
laws, such as those relating to the protection of the public 

* (The Taiyo, 1917, November issue, p. 163)—Municipal System of Tokyo, J. 
Taniya. 


78 Democracy and Japanese Government 

health, an efficient school system, the preservation of public 
order, and the performance of other services which concern not 
merely the local inhabitants but the people of the entire coun¬ 
try. 

The power of the local legislative body as such is much 
restricted, and in consequence many local matters are directly 
regulated by the national government at Tokyo. The com¬ 
munes, as a result, often suffer from the inevitable delays 
incident to such a system, to say nothing of the inconvenience 
which arises from their dependence upon the national legisla¬ 
tion with the approval of the government. Not infrequently 
the communes are compelled to wait months or years for the 
necessary authority to undertake a new project or to levy an 
additional tax which has been made necessary by the action 
of the Diet itself in imposing upon them the burden of estab¬ 
lishing and maintaining a new service. If the government 
would surrender its power of local legislation and transfer it to 
the local assemblies where it seems more properly to belong, 
it would relieve the Diet from the burden of legislating upon 
local matters for which it has neither time nor knowledge. At 
the same time it would free the representatives from the con¬ 
stant pressure to which they are subjected by their consti¬ 
tuencies. 

While the mayors of the communes are chosen by the 
municipal assembly, and while communes, like prefectures, 
have popularly elected assemblies, they are subject to strict 
control by the central government at Tokyo or its representa¬ 
tives in the provinces. The mayor may be removed from office 
by decree of the Emperor with the advice of the Home Min¬ 
ister, 4 or he may be suspended from exercising his functions 
by the governor. 5 In practice, however, these powers of re¬ 
moval and suspension are rarely if ever exercised. 

Certain acts of the municipal assembly are also subject to 
superior authority. Those measures affecting the disposition 

4 Article CLXX (Municipal Law), issued April 6, 1911. Law No. 68. 

‘ Ibid. 


Municipal Government 79 

of communal property, those relating to financial affairs, such 
as the budget, supplementary appropriations and loans, and 
acts for the establishment of fairs and markets, require the 
approval of a representative of the central government, usually 
the prefect, but sometimes the council of the prefecture. 6 
Various other acts of the municipality such as alterations of 
communal boundaries require authorization by the prefectural 
council. 7 Any act of a municipal council may be annulled by 
the prefect, if it is considered ultra vires, and so may any act in 
the passage of which a member of the council has a personal 
interest. 

In case the mayor refuses or neglects to perform any duty 
prescribed by law, the prefect may, after requesting him to 
perform the act, proceed himself or by a special delegate to 
execute the act. 8 If the duty required is one which devolves 
upon the mayor as agent of the central government, the con¬ 
ferring of this power upon the prefect is entirely logical; if, on 
the contrary, the duty is one which rests upon him in his 
character as agent of the municipality, the exercise of this 
power involves a distinct encroachment upon the freedom of 
the municipality. In this case he may appeal directly to the 
Minister of Interior. 9 

As to suffrage, the municipal law divides the people of the 
city (town and village) into two classes: those who can vote 
and those who can not. The former are called “citizens;” 10 
the latter, “residents.” 11 The “residents” of a city (town or 
village) include all those who have their residence in the city 
(town or village) without distinction as to sex, age, color, 
nationality, or condition in life. A “citizen,” however, must be 
an independent male person, that is, “one who has completed 
his twenty-fifth year;” he must be “a subject of the Empire 

• See Article CLXV-CLXVII. 

7 Ibid, Article IV. 

8 Ibid, Article CLXIII. 

9 Ibid, Articles CLVIII and CLXIII. 

10 Article IX. 

11 Article VIII. 


8o 


Democracy and Japanese Government 

and in the enjoyment of his civil rights;” and for two years he 
must have been a resident of the given local division, and must 
have paid therein a “national direct tax” of two yen or more. 
The citizen has the privilege of franchise in the local elections, 
and of eligibility to the honorary offices. 12 

One of the most peculiar features of suffrage qualification is 
that a juridical person is allowed to vote in municipal elections 
through its representative. 

There are certain disqualifications, some permanent and 
others temporary; the former include chiefly judicial convic¬ 
tion for certain offences, and the latter, bankruptcy and refusal 
to undertake honorary civil office when required. 

Under this system, the voters of a city are divided into three 
classes according to the amount of direct national taxes they 
pay. The classification is made in the following manner: The 
total sum of the taxes payable by them is ascertained, and this 
is divided into thirds. The names of electors are arranged in a 
list according to the taxes they pay, the highest tax-payer 
being first on the list. The electors are then divided into three 
groups. The first group contains the names of those whose 
tax payments will make exactly one-third of the total taxation; 
the second contains the next following names whose tax pay¬ 
ments will make a second third and the the third contains the 
remaining names. Provisions exist to meet the case of persons 
paying the same amount of taxes who may happen to fall into 
different classes. 13 

Each of these three groups elects one-third of the assembly- 
men from among the eligible citizens, the candidates being 
chosen irrespective of the classes. 14 

12 Article IX and X. The service in communal council and assembly is regarded 
honorary as the service is not compensated. 

13 An elector, the amount of whose taxes may fall into two classes, shall belong to 
the higher class. Should there be two or more persons who pay the same amount of 
taxes, and they come between two classes, the one of these, as the case may be, whose 
residence in the city has been longest, shall be included in the higher class; when the 
matter can not be decided by length of residence, it shall be decided by seniority of 
age, and in case of impracticability of the latter, by lot drawn by the mayor. (Article 
XV.) 

m Article XVIII. 


Municipal Government 81 

The effect of this three-class method of apportioning voting 
powers is that in cities with a considerable number of wealthy 
tax-payers, the well-to-do form the first and second classes, 
while the third class represents the vast majority of the small 
tax-payers. 15 

Another effect of this sytem is that two citizens of the same 
fortune will have entirely disproportionate political influence, 
if they live, one in a rich city and one in a poor city. If a 
prosperous citizen chooses to settle in a moderately wealthy 
city, he may totally upset the composition of the classes there, 
may control one-third of the electorates, and may even obtain 
personal representation in the city assembly. 

The skillful use of this curious system of electing members of 
the assembly enabled one or two large corporations in a Tokyo 
district to secure a predominant influence in city politics. In 
1911, in the district of Kojimachi-ku, the only voter in the first 
class was a juridical person who elected Mr. Kaneko. 16 

In the same district when the municipal election was held in 
1916 the number of voters in the first class was only two juri¬ 
dical persons 17 who elected one member of the assembly; the 
number in the second class was five, of which four were juridical 
persons and one a citizen. The number of voters in the third 
class was 1,919 persons who elected also one member to the 
assembly. In this same district the population then numbered 
65*893. 18 

In the municipal election of 1917, in the city of Osaka, the 
number of voters in a population of 1,557,989 was 31,744, 19 of 

15 In 1919 the Kenseikai, with a view of remedying certain undemocratic features 
in the municipalities, proposed a bill eliminating qualification to pay the national 
direct tax and giving a franchise to those who pay municipal taxes. However, the bill 
was entirely silent as to the three-class system. {The Osaka Mainchi), Editorial, 
March 19, 1919. 

16 “Baron K. Kaneko was elected a member of the city assembly of Tokyo as repre¬ 
sentative of the first-class tax-payers in Kojimachi Ku. Then the Nippon Yusen 
Kaisha was the only first-class tax-payer in that district and it voted for him.” Quoted 
in Clement’s Handbook of Modern Japan, p. 139. 

17 These juristic persons were two corporations—namely, Steamship (Yusen) Co. 
& Kingyo (Bank), quoted in p. 3, Tokyo, Nichi., March 14, 1919. 

18 Kokumin Nenkwan, 1919, p. 495 (Statistics based on report of 1917)- 

19 Kokumin Nenkwan, 1919, p. 519 (Statistics of 1917)* 


82 Democracy and Japanese Government 

which 29,199 were voters of the third class; 2,287 were voters 
in the second; 258 in the first. 20 In the district of Kita-Ku, in 
Osaka, fifteen assemblymen were to be elected under the three- 
class system. One-third of that number, namely five members, 
were elected by five corporations, three of which had enjoyed 
either a special franchise from or a contract with the city to 
carry on a public utility. 21 “Under such a condition,” says the 
Osaka Mainchi , “it is but natural that the corporations are 
anxious to elect their own candidates for their own selfish 
purpose, and as a result the canidates once elected think 
more of the interest of the corporations than of the interests of 
the public.” 22 

An acute foreign observer declares: 

This system [the three-class system] must be responsible in great 
part for the almost universal apathy of the electorate, the voting 
power being so unevenly divided that voters do not think it worth 
while to exercise their franchise. Especially is this the case with the 
noveau riche middle class, composed of commercial and professional 
people, the great majority of whom are qualified to vote in the 
third class. Thus, in the election for the assembly held in Tokyo 
in 1905, there were 42,100 names on the voters’ list, but only 7,915 
votes were actually polled. In the third class there were 37,005 
names and 5,816 votes, in the second 4,465 names and 1,825 votes, 
and in the first 630 names and 274 votes; or to put these figures in 
percentages, in the third class, 15.7 per cent.; in the second, 39.5 
per cent., and in the first 43.6 per cent., or taking the average of ail 
classes, 18.8 per cent, of the electorate vote. 

Not only has it been impossible in the past to get more than a 
modicum of the electorate to vote at an election for a city assembly, 
but the system upon which elections are conducted makes it almost 
impossible to bring about any improvement in the ability of the 


20 The Osaka Mainchi, Editorial, p. i, March 19, 1919. 

Ibid. 

22 Osaka Mainchi, July 9, 1919, p. 3. 

The number of the voters of the three classes in Osaka is as follows: 


South District East District North District 

First Class. 64 43 5 

Second Class. 689 396 265 

Third Class. 9.904 7.505 6,965 





Municipal Government 83 

members of the assembly. The voting power is so unequal that, 
even if the vast majority of the electorate, say 80 per cent., were to 
be stirred up by a popular agitation in favor of honest government, 
it would be still possible for two-thirds of the members of the 
assembly to be elected by the remaining 20 per cent, of the voters, 
who conceivably might not be affected by the popular movement. 
In fact in Tokyo in 1905 one-third of the members of the assembly 
were elected by a little more than one-half of the one per cent, of 
the qualified voters. 23 

To be eligible for membership in a municipal assembly a 
person must be a qualified voter, that is, a person paying a 
tax amounting to two yen or more a year and enjoy full civil 
rights. However, many persons are disqualified by reason of 
their positions. Thus officials and members of personnel by 
which the prefectural government exercises control over the 
communes, salaried officials of the city, prosecuting attorneys, 
police officials, tax-collectors, priests, school teachers of ele¬ 
mentary schools, those who contract with the city, and direc¬ 
tors and managers of unlimited corporations doing business 
under contract with the city are excluded. The same dis¬ 
qualifications apply to father and son or to two brothers, who 
may not at the same time be members of an assembly, and, if 
both are elected, the older is admitted to membership. 24 

So far as the property qualifications of the candidates for the 
assembly are concerned, they are more undemocratic than in 
the national government where the property qualifications of 
candidates for the House have long ago disappeared. 

The Japanese municipal code makes no provision for any 
system of primaries, caucuses, nomination papers, or, indeed, 
for any formal method of putting candidates in the field. As 
in France the absence of any nomination of candidates in 
advance of the actual polling is characteristic of Japanese 
municipal election. The candidates receive no official recogni- 

2 3 Japanese Government Documents, W. W. McLaren, Transactions of the Asiatic 
Society of Japan, pp. 97-99. 

24 Article XVIII—If father and son or two brothers are elected from the same 
district, the person who received the highest number of votes is declared to be elected. 


84 Democracy and Japanese Government 

tion as in America. So far as the election authorities are con¬ 
cerned, they recognize no candidate for the municipal assem¬ 
bly; they set before the voter at the polls no list of aspirants; 
they restrict his entire freedom of choice in no way what¬ 
ever. 

In order to be elected, a candidate for admission to the 
assembly must have secured a majority of the votes cast. 
However, the number of ballots obtained must not be less than 
one-seventh of that obtained by dividing the total number of 
the electors in each class entered in the electoral list by the 
fixed number of members to be returned from each class. 

It is interesting to note that in the Japanese municipal 
elections electors in each class vote separately. Article XXII of 
municipal law provides that electors of third class shall vote 
first; electors in second class second; electors in the first class 
last. 

The political psychology of the Japanese voters presents 
more or less of a puzzle to the foreign student of politics. That 
the Japanese who possesses considerable natural impulsiveness 
should display calm in even hotly contested elections is a mat¬ 
ter that seems to call for some comment. One who watches 
a Japanese municipal campaign can not fail to get the impres¬ 
sion that the local elections do not even ruffle the surface of 
everyday life. The campaign is largely, if not entirely, con¬ 
ducted by private canvasses, but not by speech-making as in 
America. It is said that this general lack of interest shown by 
the voters is due partly to the comparative inefficiency of the 
local party organization, but largely to the fact that the voters 
are less interested in politics under the present system of gov¬ 
ernment. 

The power of the Japanese city assembly is very limited. 
The general powers granted to the assembly are purely advis¬ 
ory, the initiative resting with the higher authorities, and the 
assembly having nothing but the privilege of tendering its 
advice, which may or may not be accepted. The powers of the 
assembly as enumerated in the municipal law are as follows: 


Municipal Government 85 

The determination of the city budget as well as the approval 
of any outlay not included in the budget or of one exceeding 
the estimate; the giving of publicity to the annual accounts 
of receipts and expenditures; determining the modes of im¬ 
posing and of collecting duties, fees, city taxes, and services in 
person or in kind, so far as they are not determined by laws or 
Imperial ordinances; alienation, purchase, exchange, or 
mortgaging of the immovable property of the city; matters 
relating to the disposition of the stock and property, etc., 
selection of the municipal executive. 25 

Throughout Japan, the system of municipal administration 
exhibits on a small scale the working of the political philosophy 
of our national government. Like the national constitution, 
the municipal law limits the direct authority of the electorate, 
providing various checks on and safeguards against the popular 
assembly. The functions and powers of the executive are 
placed far beyond the control of the representatives of the 
people. Just as the National House of Representatives and 
the prefectural or Fu assemblies lack legislative independence, 
so the city assemblies are mere auxiliary bodies. Their juris¬ 
diction is restricted at every turn; first by the limitation of 
their deliberative powers, then by the institution of a per¬ 
manent mayor and council, and finally by the strict control of 
the national government. 

The doctrines of “popular responsibility/’ which is more or 
less realized under the political constitutions of all democratic 
countries where executive officers can be removed from office 
by the adverse vote of a representative assembly, or by the 
termination of a brief specified term of office, or by impeach¬ 
ment or recall, finds no place in the local government of Japan. 
The mayor and council, once chosen, are not only independent 
of the representatives of the people, namely the assembly, but 
are practically irremovable. Just as in relation to the national 
legislature the ministers stand outside the representative body 
of the people, the mayor and council, once chosen, are no longer 


25 Article LXVII 


86 Democracy and Japanese Government 

subject to the assembly. The mayor, like the Ministers of 
State, has the right to attend all meetings of the assembly and 
to speak or to be heard at any time upon any subject within his 
jurisdiction. 26 Again, like the national cabinet, which can 
convoke a special session of the Diet, the municipal executive 
can call the assembly at any time he deems necessary. 

There is, however, one sphere in which, in the municipal 
government as in the national, the popular assembly can exer¬ 
cise to a certain extent its legitimate power over the executive. 
This is in the sphere of finance. The assembly has the legal 
power to refuse by majority vote to approve the budget of the 
mayor, but it can not prevent the execution of any laws already 
enacted by refusing to approve the necessary appropriations. 
If these appropriations are not made by the assembly, the Fu 
or prefectural governor can include the necessary amount of 
such expenditures in the budget in order to carry out the laws 
or Imperial ordinances already upon the statute books. More¬ 
over, the government, when it regards it as necessary, can 
impose any amount of expenditure upon the city without the 
consent of the assembly. ArticleCLXIII says: “Whena city does 
not include in its budget an expenditure imposed upon it by 
law or ordinance, or one that has been ordered by duly con¬ 
stituted authorities, or when it does not approve or actually 
supply funds for an extraordinary expense, the Fu or prefec¬ 
tural governor may, upon the statement of his reason for so 
doing, embody the amount of such expenditure in the budget 
or order payment of the same.” 

The upshot of this provision is that under no conceivable 
circumstance can the assembly withhold the funds necessary 
to enable the city government to exercise its functions. When 
the budget fails to pass the assembly a certain amount of 
embarrassment may ensue, particularly if the city has some 
project to undertake. Even so, the difficulties may not be so 
great as might be expected, since every project can be carried 
out if the approval of the higher authority is secured. 


26 Article LI. 


Municipal Government 87 

The other organ of municipal government is the council. 
This body consists of a mayor and a number of members, some 
of whom are paid and some unpaid. The number of unpaid 
members of the council is fixed by municipal code. 27 The num¬ 
ber of paid members is determined by the city ordinance sub¬ 
ject to the approval of higher authority. 28 In general the total 
membership of the council is not very large. Tokyo, for 
example, with an assembly of seventy-five members, has 
eighteen members of the council, including a mayor, three 
deputy mayors and two professional administrators called 
shi-san-yo. However, these shi-san-yo do not participate in 
the deliberations of the council except when questions relating 
to their respective jurisdictions arise. In the smaller cities most 
of the members of the council are honorary or unpaid members. 

All members of the council are appointed for terms of four 
years. The choice of honorary members of the council is made 
from within the assembly. In the case of paid members the 
council may select any one who is qualified for the position. 
However the choice of all paid members of the council must be 
confirmed by the higher authorities before it becomes valid. 

The council like the German administrative board, the 
Magistrat, was an executive body, but under the revised law 
of 1911 it has lost its executive and administrative functions. 
It has become merely a deliberative and advisory body. 29 
The duties of the council are set forth partly in the municipal 
code, partly in the detailed ordinances, and partly in instruc¬ 
tions from the higher authorities. Article LXVII of Shisei [mu¬ 
nicipal law] confers the following powers: (1) To deliberate and 
decide those questions which are entrusted by the assembly 
to its legal sphere of jurisdiction; (2) to express its opinion on 
the subjects to be presented to the assembly by the mayor; 

27 The number of honorary members of the council is fixed at six except in the 
cities with special privilege. In such cities the number may be increased up to 12. 
See Articles LXV and LXVI. 

2 8 Article LXXIV. 

2# The main business of the council at present is the investigation and amplification 
of resolutions passed by assembly. 


88 Democracy and Japanese Government 

(3) to decide all questions which come within its jurisdiction. 
The council also performs within certain limits judicial func¬ 
tions such as the settling of claims against the city when the 
amount does not exceed 1,000 yen. 30 

Though technically the council is the creature of the assem¬ 
bly by virtue of its appointment by that body, its action is 
independent. The council can perform in some cases all the 
functions of the assembly. Article XCI of the Municipal Law 
says: “Whenever the mayor has no time to convoke a meeting 
of the assembly or when an attendance of members of the 
assembly does not constitute one-half of its members, the 
mayor can present to the council any matter which is within 
the legal sphere of jurisdiction of the assembly. 31 

The meetings of the council, unlike those of the assembly, 
are not open to the public, and they are held more frequently 
than those of assembly. The mayor can call the council at 
any time. Upon the demand of half of the honorary members 
of the council he must do so. The attendance of the chairman 
(mayor) or his representative and at least one-half of the 
honorary members of the council is required for the validity 
of meeting. 32 

The most important personage in the municipal govern¬ 
ment is the mayor. He is the chief magistrate of the city. 
He governs the city and represents it. 33 His duties are twofold: 
those to be performed as an agent of national government, 
and those as the head of the community he represents. As to 
the former, he is responsible for the due execution of all national 
and prefectural laws and regulations and imperial ordinances 
incumbent on a commune. As to the latter he has to carry 
out the resolutions of the assembly and council. 

As an agent of the national government the J apanese mayor, 
like his French counterpart, has an enormous power. He is 
entrusted with the enforcement of all national laws and 

30 Tokyo Shi-Sei Gaiyo, p. 15 (1913 Edition). 

31 Article LI I. 

32 Ibid, LXX. 

33 Article LXXXVII. 


Municipal Government 89 

instructions within the limits of the city without concurrence 
on the part of the assembly or the council. He is also entrusted 
with police power. Article II of Shiho-keisatsu (Police Law) 
says that the mayor is required, under the direction of the 
prosecuting attorney of the province, to search out criminals 
within the commune. He is entrusted with the supervision 
of the civil register. 

The system of the civil register involves the preparation 
and maintenance of a register of all the births, marriages and 
deaths that take place within the commune. The mayor is 
also entrusted with military duties, acting in this matter as 
an agent of the Minister of War at Tokyo. He prepares each 
year the list of persons liable to military service. 

Another duty of the Japanese mayor as an agent of the 
national government is his responsibility for carrying out the 
national as well as the local election laws. He is responsible 
for the proper supervision of all matters connected with the 
preparation of the voters’ lists to be used in the national, 
prefectural or Fu, and communal elections. 34 

As the head of the municipal administration, the mayor is 
the apex of the municipal government just as the Emperor is 
the apex of the national government. Article LXXXVII of the 
Municipal Law mentions the following matters as falling within 
the province of the executive: The preparation of subjects for 
deliberation in the assembly and in the council and the execu¬ 
tion of resolutions of the assembly and the council; the adminis¬ 
tration of the city revenue; direction of receipts and payments 
fixed in the budget; the general supervision of the city prop¬ 
erty ; supervision over the city officials and disciplinary 
authority over them; imposition and collection of fees and of 
taxes determined by law or by the assembly. In such capacities 
the mayor makes an elaborate annual report to the local 
authorities. He also makes practically all appointments of 
city officers although sometimes his choice is subject to the 
approval of the assembly or of a higher authority. 

34 See “Law of House” and also Shisei. 


90 


Democracy and Japanese Government 


As to the financial power, it is the duty of the Japanese 
mayor to see that the revenues of the city are properly collected. 
He makes an annual report to the assembly on the financial 
condition of the city. A copy of this report also goes to the 
higher authorities. 

As the head of the commune, he is also entrusted, under a 
recent law, with the duty of looking after all highways within 
the municipality. 

As chairman of the council the power of the mayor is enor¬ 
mous. Just as the council may refuse to pass such resolutions 
of the assembly as it believes to be illegal or improper, so it is 
the right and duty of the mayor to control the action of the 
council. If any decision of the council appears to exceed its 
authority or is prejudicial to public good, he may, upon his 
own judgment or under the instruction of the higher authori¬ 
ties, suspend the execution of the regulation of the council . 35 
If the suspension of execution of its decision is due to the ruling 
of the prefectural or Fu council and the case involves existing 
laws or an Imperial ordinance, the council may appeal to the 
administrative court . 36 

The power of the mayor is further enlarged by the fact that 
he can act independently of the council in case of emergency. 
“When any question,” reads the provision, “which belongs to 
the competency of the council requires immediate settlement, 
so that there is no time for convoking a meeting of the council, 
the mayor may decide it upon his own judgment and make a 
report thereon at the next sitting of the council . 37 

So important is the office of the Japanese mayor that appoint¬ 
ment to such a position requires confirmation by the crown. 
Article LXXIII of the Municipal Law reads: “The mayor shall 
be appointed for four years. The Home Minister shall cause 
the assembly to make a list of names of three candidates, which 
he shall present to the crown, and ask the crown’s pleasure in 

36 Ibid. The mayor is given similar power as to the assembly by Article XC. 

36 Ibid. 

37 Article XCI. 


Municipal Government 


9i 


regard to the selection of one of them.” If he is unable to 
obtain the Imperial approval of any of them he shall cause 
the assembly to make another proposal of candidates. If he 
is still unable to obtain the Imperial approval he shall, until 
the city assembly presents proper candidates, either appoint a 
deputy pro tempore or despatch a government official to dis¬ 
charge the mayor’s duties at the expense of the city . 38 The 
real power of this provision is in the hands of the Home Minis¬ 
ter. The approval of the Emperor is merely nominal. 

The municipal government of Japan, patterned as it is 
largely from the Prussian system, has been to a considerable 
extent a failure. This failure can be attributed mainly to too 
much partisan politics in municipalities. 

Examination elsewhere showed the fact that the members 
of the assembly elected under the undemocratic three-class 
system have the power of recommending the candidates for 
mayor. And this recommendation of candidates, according to 
Mr. Ozaki, means practically appointment , 39 for thus far the 
Emperor has never refused to appoint the one who has re¬ 
ceived the highest number of votes among the three candidates 
recommended by the assembly . 40 This means that assembly- 
men have a large influence in the selection of a mayor. They 
will recommend and select only such a person as is likely to 
pursue their policy. 

If the popularly elected members did not play politics 
among themselves, this power conferred upon the assembly 
might be beneficial instead of harmful, because it would act 
as a check upon the probable abuse of power by the executive. 

Although the mayor has supervisory power over the entire 
municipal administration for which he is responsible, it is said 
that he has not much independent power in practice either to 
appoint or to dismiss even minor municipal official without 
consulting the assembly . 41 This practice compels a mayor to 

38 Article CLXIV. 

39 Mr. Ozaki, conversation with the writer in New York, 1919. 

40 Ibid. 

41 Nippon Oyobi Nippon Jin , No. 748, January, 1919- 


92 Democracy and Japanese Government 

carry on his administration less effectively and efficiently. 
There has been a tendency during recent years for subordinate 
officers to respect the members of the assembly rather than the 
mayor himself, since they are in no danger of losing their places 
when they are in harmony with the assemblymen. Conse¬ 
quently the honor of being mayor is less attractive to the able 
men of Japan than it is to the able men of such countries as 
England, America, and Germany. 

It is reputed that when Mr. Okuda was elected mayor of 
Tokyo, he made a personal visit to each member of the assem¬ 
bly in order to ingratiate himself. 42 This clearly indicates the 
difficulties confronting any Japanese mayor in carrying on a 
successful administration. At present the municipal govern¬ 
ment of Tokyo is in the hands of a few politicians who control 
the parties. In 1919 the members of the assembly belonged 
to the following political parties: twenty-seven to Shiyu-kai; 
fifteen to Chuusei-kurabu; twenty-six to Kowa-kai; seven to 
Mushozoku. 43 

There exists in practically every large city in Japan a 
miniature Tammany Hall. Dr. Washio, describing the Tam¬ 
many of Tokyo, says: “The assembly is at present a den of 
thieves controlled by the capitalists of the city, and the council 
elected by the assembly from among its own members is the 
nerve center of corruption and the most trying body for the 
mayor to deal with. They have long had the reputation of 
being the most subtle, crooked, and unscrupulous politicians. 
If the mayor happens to be a man of doubtful character, any 
sort of scandalous plan can be concocted by this body. And 
if he happens to be a clean man, he is sure to be subjected to 
all sorts of abuse and criticism. 44 

To appreciate further the magnitude of city politics and to 
show the real conditions of our municipal administration, let 
us illustrate as an example municipal politics in the city of 
Tokyo. 

42 Nippon Oyobi Nippon Jin, No. 748, January, 1919, p. 68. 

43 Kokumin Nenkwan, 1919, p. 491. 

44 Tammany of Tokyo, by Dr. Washio. Japan Advertiser, April io, 1918. 


Municipal Government 


93 


Prior to the appointment of Mr. Tajiri on April 5, 1918, the 
mayoralty office in Tokyo was vacant for eight months despite 
the fact that the authorities were earnestly seeking for a proper 
candidate. During this long period the city was without a 
mayor, and the municipal administration was carried on by 
the council. After eight months the city of Tokyo finally 
found a mayor in the person of Viscount Tajiri who was elected 
by the support of two factions of the assembly with a majority 
of seven votes over Mr. Abe. Viscount Tajiri was an able man 
with a bureaucratic career and a rigorous temper. The first 
objection to his qualification for the mayoralty office was that 
he was not flexible enough to work with the members of the 
council, with whom he had naturally to participate in the 
executive work. In other words, he was not acceptable to the 
interests of the council. 45 

“We wonder,” says the Yorodzu, “if the municipal officials 
consider municipal administration a sort of gambling and the 
municipal assembly a market. They do not face municipal 
administration with conviction and principles; during the 
proceedings of the municipal assembly they may be only 
calculating their own interests.” 46 

Commenting upon the difficult problem of selecting may¬ 
oralty candidates in the city of Tokyo, Dr. Washio remarks: 

The mayor is sought preferably from men with ministerial 
dignity. The assembly itself being a body of unscrupulous poli¬ 
ticians of rather low type, its members have enough sense to know 
that there can never be found among themselves a man of sufficient 
dignity to be acceptable to the public as the mayor of this city 
[Tokyo]. And yet they want to control him in all practical questions 
of the city administration. This is an unusual situation. It can be 
remedied only by substitution of the system of direct election for the 
present system of indirect election which even iron-headed Bismarck 
condemned as an agency through which the dominant class revamps 
the popular will to suit its own interests. 47 

45 Yorodzu , June 4, i 9 I 9 » P- i* 

46 Ibid. 

47 Dr. Washio, Tammany of Tokyo, Japan Advertiser, April 10, 1918. 


f 


94 Democracy and Japanese Government 

The restriction of suffrage makes it impossible for the 
people to control their own affairs. In limiting the right to 
vote on municipal problems, the lawmakers evidently pro¬ 
ceeded, as in the case of the national government, upon the 
theory that the policy of a city with reference to the public 
utilities or what not should be controlled by its tax-payers. 
The justification for this provision is not apparent in the 
case of a city inasmuch as the burden of supporting the public 
service industries of a city is not borne by the tax-payers as 
such, but by the people generally. Such a system makes it 
possible for the tax-paying class to control public utilities in 
their own interest and to the disadvantage of the general public. 

The resignation of Mayor Sakatani in 1917 as a result of his 
failure to effect a compromise with the council over the ques¬ 
tion of municipal ownership of electric companies in order to 
prevent unjust competition gives a side-light on the under¬ 
current of politics in the city. 

The evils in administration are more easily traced in the 
city where we find a numerically small but very wealthy class 
and a large class owning little or no property. There the 
general political movement toward democracy has encountered 
the most obstinate resistance. At present only a small part of 
the population own land or capital enough to be allowed to 
participate in the municipal elections. The overwhelming 
majority of those who live in cities are employees and tenants. 
In the year 1913, the total franchise-holders under the tax- 
paying qualification of national direct tax of two yen a year 
were only 297,956 48 out of a total population of 8,999,264 49 
in all the cities of Japan having a population over 30,000. 

In 1917, the entire population of Tokyo was 2,349,830, 50 
out of which only about 59,471 51 persons were property 
owners paying a direct national tax of two yen a year. 

48 Nippon Teikoku, No. 36, Tokei Nen Kwan (Japan Statistics No. 36;, Year 1918, 
p. 89 (Section Ryakusetsu). 

49 Ibid, p. 27. 

60 Kokumin Nen Kwan, 1919, p. 496. 

51 Statistics of year 1911—Year Book of Tokyo Municipal Government (Tokyo 
Shisei Gaiyo ) issued by Tokyo City Government, 1913, p. 18. 


Municipal Government 


95 


This property-owning minority class in the cities must be 
taken into account in any attempt to find an explanation of 
the reluctance on the part of the property-owning class to 
recognize the necessity of civic improvement in the way of 
hospitals, transportation lines, etc., since any improvement 
means additional taxation imposed on the property owners. 
Inequalities in the assessment of property for taxation are 
permitted to exist in favor of landlords. 

Let us examine this point with more detail. 

The total area of land in the city of Tokyo in 1918 was 
23,468,000 tsubo, out of which 8,654,000 tsubo belonged to the 
national government; 1,245,000 to the city, and 13,567,000 
to private persons. 52 In the same year, the total number of 
persons who participated in the ownership of these lands was 
22,476. 53 The legal valuation of those private lands was 
estimated at 94,719,324 s4 yen, that is, about 7.60 yen per 
tsubo. However, at present in no part of the city can land be 
found which can be bought at 7.60 yen per tsubo. The actual 
valuation of land at present in Tokyo is about eight times 
higher than the legal valuation which is made by the com¬ 
mittees appointed from among the property-owners together 
with some government officials. 

According to Professor Abe, the total land tax in the city of 
Tokyo in 1918 was 226,310.68 yen. 55 Therefore, if the assess¬ 
ment were to be made on the real valuation of the land, the 
revenue from the land would be eight times 226,310.68 yen 
or 1,810,485.44 yen—an increase of 1,600,000 yen which will 
be ample enough to better the present miserable municipal 
conditions. 

A more undemocratic feature in connection with real estate 
in the city of Tokyo is that there is a large area of land which 
enjoys a special lower rate of taxation. This land is classified 

62 Ibid, p. 497. 

53 Ibid, p. 497. 

54 Professor Abe, Finance and improvement in the Greater Tokyo, The Chugai 
Shinron, May issue, p. 34. 

55 Ibid, p. 34. This amount of tax does not include national and prefectural taxes. 


g 6 Democracy and Japanese Government 

as “rice field,” “forest land,” “farms” and “swampy land.” The 
total area which enjoys this special taxation is 834,261 tsabo. 
The legal valuation of these different lands per tsubo is: rice 
fields, 14 sen; 56 farm land, 5 sen; forest land, 1 sen; field, 
.56 sen; swampy land, .22 sen. 57 

Another illustration of the unsatisfactions of a government 
in which property-owners are dominant is an astonishing lack 
of transportation facilities in Tokyo as well as in other cities. 
The Mancho gives the following statistics as to the number 
of street cars in the city of Tokyo during the last three years: 

1917 1918 1919 

Average number of cars running a day . 1,004 996 944 

Number of passengers (average a day) . . 860,000 930,000 I,i70,000 58 

The above figures show that the transportation system 
which is at present under municipal ownership is left unim¬ 
proved. 

Before leaving this subject, a word or two must be said of 
town and village governments. The form of government in 
towns and villages is similar to that in cities except that the 
council is absent in town [and village]. The chief differences 
between city and town governments are in the matter of the 
suffrage, and in respect to their legal relations with the central 
government. In the city the voters are divided into three 
classes; in the town they are divided into two. While the city 
is independent financially and politically and constitutes an 
independent urban county, the town and the village form 
parts of the districts in which they are situated. In other 
words, in the city, state supervision comes either from the 
prefect or from the Home Minister, but in the town and in the 
village it comes from a district authority. 

In both city and town government, however, the main 
spring of all local actions comes from the Home Minister who 
is the original source of power. Administration is completely 

56 Ibid, p. 34. 

57 Ibid, p. 34. 

58 The Mancho, February 5, 1920. 


Municipal Government 


97 


centralized. Just as the Emperor, in theory, is the apex of the 
national government, ruling by the divine right, so his deputy, 
the Minister of Interior, is the apex of the local government; 
through him and through his subordinates, the bureaucracy 
of our government is maintained in all parts of Japan. 













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